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Abstract 
 
Venture capital-backed initial public offerings (IPO), one of the most important exit route 
for venture capital firms, display similarities and differences compared to non venture-
backed public listings. Hence, academic and industry interest has increased gradually in 
recent years, which has led to different theories in explaining IPO characteristics and 
performances. Using standard methodologies, we investigate the short-term stock price 
performance of venture capital-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) in Europe and in the 
US during the period 2000-2015. We analyse and compare the characteristics of venture 
capital-backed and other non venture-backed flotations from the above-mentioned two 
geographic regions. We regress initial returns and amounts of ‘money left on the table’ 
over several IPO deal characteristics. We expect that the US IPO market present clearer 
and easy-to-detect characteristics and relations due to its superior and well-functioning 
stock, and IPO market. Furthermore, it is also anticipated that findings regarding venture 
capital-backed IPOs partly support the certification and grandstanding hypotheses. This 
paper provides weak support for the former hypothesis but strong support for the latter 
one. We believe that by examining factors we can detect and explain performance 
differences across geographic regions and different types of sponsorship. Hence, it could 
have useful implications for external investors and for venture capitalists.  
 
Key-words: venture capital, exits, IPO, underpricing, certification, grandstanding 
JEL-Codes: G10, G11, G20, G24, G34 
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Resumo 
 
Ofertas publicas iniciais (IPOs), uma das mais importantes estrategias de saída, 
suportadas por empresas de venture capital demostram semelhanças e diferenças quando 
comparadas com listagens publicas de empresas não suportadas por venture capital. Por 
esta razão, interesse no tema tem crescido gradualmente nos últimos anos, dando origem 
a diferentes teorias que explicam as diferentes caracteristicas das IPOs e a sua 
performance. Neste trabalho investigamos a performance da rendibilidade das ações no 
curto prazo de IPOs suportadas por venture capital na Europa e nos Estados Unidos 
durante o period de 2000-2015. Comparamos e analisamos as caracteristicas de listagens 
suportadas e outras não suportadas por venture capital nas regiões mencionadas. Foi feita 
uma regressão entre rendibilidade inicial e quantidades de “money left on the table” em 
diferentes caracteristicas de IPOs. A nossa expectativa é que o mercado de IPOs nos 
Estados Unidos apresente caracteristicas e relações mais claras e fáceis de detetar devido 
ao seu superior mercado de ações e IPOs. Adicionalmente, antecipamos que os resultados 
de IPOs suportadas por venture capital suportam parcialmente as hipoteses de 
“certification” e “grandstanding”. Este trabalho oferece pouco suporte à primeira hipotese 
mas oferece forte suporte à segunda. Acreditamos que examinando fatores conseguimos 
detetar e explicar diferenças na performace nas diferentes regiões e nos diferentes tipos 
de patrocínio. Desta forma, poderá ter implicações uteis a investidores externos e 
venture capitalists. 
 
Palavras chave: venture capital, IPOs, underpricing, certification, grandstanding  
Classificação JEL: G10, G11, G20, G24, G34 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Asymmetric information between corporate insiders and external investors is present in 
capital markets when a relatively unknown firm issues securities. The ability of third-
party specialists to certify value has been examined by academics in recent years, e.g. 
Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990).  
Venture capitalists (VCs) provide external source of financing for small and medium-
sized firms, thus, they are intermediaries. In this paper, we scrutinize the role of venture 
capital backing in public listings. Venture capital-backed entities and their preferred exit 
routes have also been a popular topic among academics. Our interest lies in the short-term 
stock performance of venture-backed IPOs. The traditional approach is to compare the 
underpricing (UP) of venture-backed and non VC-backed IPOs and assign the difference 
to sponsorship, or to conduct OLS regressions using a dummy variable for sponsorship. 
Using this method, Bradley and Jordan (2002) find that there is no difference between the 
two types of IPOs after taking into account industry and underwriter quality. However, it 
is found that the level of UP can be influenced by using different methodologies 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1997).  
As we stated before, we focus on the initial return (first-day) financial performance of 
IPOs to analyse whether these listings are underpriced. This phenomenon in finance is 
well-researched. Academic literature related to venture capital-backed (VC-backed) 
companies supports the certification and monitoring hypothesis, which state that VC-
backing can be associated with higher quality (certified value) and higher value added 
due to closer monitoring. Barry et al. (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) conduct 
the first research related to venture-backed IPOs. Barry et al. investigate the monitoring 
role of venture capital firms in public listings between 1978 and 1987. The authors find 
that the size of ownership, the length of board service, and the number of venture 
capitalists involved in transactions are inversely related to the underpricing level. They 
deduce that better monitoring by VCs lead to less underpricing. Megginson and Weiss 
compare venture capital-backed listings to non VC-backed ones and find significantly 
lower first-day returns of VC-backed IPOs. These findings are consistent with the view 
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that venture capitalists’ presence works as an indication of true value and therefore less 
underpricing is expected.  
On the other hand, the conflict of interest between VCs and portfolio companies may 
affect the post-IPO performance. Gompers (1996) introduce the grandstanding hypothesis 
which argues younger venture capital firms are less averse to take firms public 
prematurely than seasoned ones as a signal of ability and performance.  The author argues 
that reputation is crucial to future fundraising. Hence VCs tend to bear the cost of 
underpricing because bringing a company public signals ability. Consequently, less 
established VCs might take portfolio companies public with higher underpricing which 
can have a large effect on their fundraising ability. Hence, we expect that these venture 
capital firms take public younger and smaller firms. 
Since the birth of these papers, more and more academics seek to research the venture 
capital market and its specific characteristics. Other academics put emphasis on the 
contracting environment between entrepreneurs and venture capital firms in which 
financial resources are exchanged for ownership and voting rights, along with assignment 
of seats on the board. Lee and Wahal (2004) state that ‘the receipt of venture funding is 
the outcome of protracted negotiations between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.’ 
In this study, we choose the US and Western Europe as the geographical focuses. 
Investigation and comparison of these markets can add insights into to the understanding 
of the venture capital mechanism and the regional differences. We analyse a sample of 
4,036 IPOs between 2000 and 2015, of which over 28% (1,132) are venture-backed. We 
observe significant clustering across both industry and geographical aspects. Consistent 
with the results of Lee and Wahal, the IPO market is dominated by technology-intensive 
industries, namely, information technology and biotechnology. Since there can be non-
stationarity in our sample (Ritter and Welch, 2002), we analyse the IPOs over various 
sub-periods.  
To analyse grandstanding we first group venture capital firms into two groups based on 
size of capital under management. As a next step, we undertake regressions following 
Gompers (1996). The endogenous variables are proxies for underpricing and few of the 
exogenous variables are proxies for VC reputation.  
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We formulate four research questions:  
i. How do the short-term performances of VC-backed IPOs versus non VC-backed 
IPOs look like post-listing in Europe and in the US? 
ii. What are the differences between the US and Europe regarding venture capital-
backed IPOs? 
iii. Is the certification hypothesis supported by our findings based on our European 
and US samples? 
iv. Is the grandstanding hypothesis supported by our findings based on our European 
and US samples? 
 
We find that (i) in almost all cases, venture capital-backed IPOs present higher 
underpricing; (ii) firm age and lock-up period reduces underpricing, especially among 
VC-backed IPOs; (iii) initial return and ‘money left on the table’ as dependent variables 
lead to fairly similar model characteristics; (iv) offer size has a positive relation with 
underpricing; (v) during hot IPO market periods, underpricing tends to be lower for both 
VC-backed and non VC-backed IPOs; and (vi) US venture-backed IPOs show larger 
underpricing.  
 
1.2 Motivation and Aim 
Nowadays, one can meet with private equity funds on the streets, in the shopping malls 
or even on the internet. There are thousands of firms backed by private equity funds all 
around us. Indeed, the private equity asset class, which includes venture capital, has 
become a substantial part of the economies in both the US and in Europe. For example, 
the capital raised by the global private equity industry amounted $527 billion in 2015 and 
increased by 12 percent on average in the last five years (Bain & Company, 2016). 
Therefore, private equity funds and their activity could not avoid being subject of heavy 
debates. Academic and practitioner scrutiny has gradually increased in the last decade, 
and regulators have paid more attention to this immensely growing asset class.  
In our dissertation, we put the venture capital-backed IPO performances in the spotlight 
during the time period 2000-2015. Buyout and venture capital funds belong to the same 
asset class, but they differ in several ways. In this paper, we focus on venture capital-
backed firms. We consider buyout funds to have different characteristics, and analysing 
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this segment of private equity market would require a larger research than contained in a 
master thesis. 
The aim of this study is not to answer whether venture capital firms should or should not 
choose initial public offering as a compelling exit route, we simply show what the 
differences in these two markets (Europe and the US) are. Additionally, we might be able 
to detect factors that influence the difference in stock market performances. Analysing 
the performance of venture-backed companies may offer new insights into the value 
added by venture capitalists. The academic literature provides a comprehensive analysis 
of this topic, yet the findings are inconclusive.  Although there are many existing studies 
about this topic, we believe that by using up-to-date data, this study can contribute further 
to existing literature. Our findings intend to contribute to the improvement of the 
European venture capital market.   
With this study, we will be able to obtain a comprehensive overview over IPOs as an exit 
route for venture capitalists and to get a better understanding of the characteristics of 
venture capital backing in the US and Europe. 
The remainder of the paper is organised into sections as followed. Section 3 introduces 
the topic and provides short insight into how venture capital works. Additionally, the 
literature review of the topic shows and intorduces the most relevant academic papers 
about venture capital-backed IPOs and their characteristics. Section 4 presents our 
hypotheses. In Section 5, we present our data and research methodology. Afterwards, in 
Section 6, the results and findings of our econometric calculations are described in detail. 
At the end of this work, in Section 7, the summary of the findings of the research and our 
conclusion can be found. 
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2 Literature Review 
The literature review, on the role of venture capital in IPO process, provides a detailed 
overview of venture capital related IPO characteristics, and performances. Although large 
amounts of academic papers about the aforementioned topic were found, clearly, the 
findings are not conclusive due to different time periods, geography, or methods. 
 
2.1 Introduction into the Asset Class Venture Capital 
2.1.1 The Origin of Venture Capital 
Landström (2007) regards venture capital as an activity that has roots from ancient times. 
He argues that mankind has always had a tendency or need to invest in projects with high-
risk profile. As an extraordinary example, we can mention the venture of Christopher 
Columbus financed by Queen Isabella of Spain. Another example is the investment 
activity of private individuals during the industrial revolution in the 19th and early 20th 
century. According to the author, the Boston area was perhaps the root of the modern, 
organised venture capital market, which provided the first US venture capital firm, called 
American Research and Development Corporation founded in 1946. The Silicon Valley, 
a region where a dense cluster of technology-based enterprises can be found, began to 
rise in the early 1960s.  
The academic interest in venture capital can be dated back to the 1970s. Afterwards it 
expanded substantially in the following decades. Since the US venture market is the most 
dynamic venture capital market, the interest was especially strong among researchers in 
the US.  
 
2.1.2 What Is Entrepreneurship? 
The term has French origins, and its literal translation is “undertaker”. According to 
Schumpeter (1934), the entrepreneur is the person who is actively searching for 
opportunities to innovate. Consequently, entrepreneurship contributes to economic 
development, since it permanently challenges the status quo of the market by delivering 
profits from risky projects and by combining resources in unusual ways.  
Nowadays, entrepreneurship can be described as a multistep process. First, the 
entrepreneur recognises an opportunity to create value by combining resources. Second, 
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the entrepreneur plans a strategy to gain control over the necessary resources. Third, the 
plan is implemented and carried out to realize the venture. Finally, entrepreneurs harvest 
their successful ventures (Smith and Smith, 2007). 
 
2.1.3 The Definition of Venture Capital 
Isaksson (2006) defines venture capital as private investments made in ventures that are 
not quoted on a stock market, and they are likely to grow significantly and become notable 
players internationally.  
Andersen (2015) defines private equity as ‘investments that range from investments in 
unlisted (i.e. private) companies in return for shares or other ownership interests (i.e. 
equity) in such companies.’ Normally, private equity comprises investments in firms at 
all stages of development, which can range from start-ups to mature businesses. We have 
to highlight that the term ‘private equity’ in the US refers to investments in more mature 
companies, while ‘venture capital’ can be seen as investments in businesses at their early 
stage. According to Gompers (1993), private equity investments can be divided into four 
different subclasses such as venture, mezzanine, buyout, and distress capital. In the 
spotlight of this research paper stands venture capital. Moreover, we regard the term 
‘private equity’ as the asset class that contains as a subclass e.g. venture or buyout capital. 
Andersen (2015) regards ‘venture capital’ as ‘capital invested in return for shares in 
unlisted companies in the early stages of their development. Such investments are made 
with a view to making a profit on the subsequent sale of the shares. Venture capital 
investors are willing to accept a relatively high risk, but on the other hand they expect a 
high return.’ In sum, the target of venture capital funds are young, innovative and fast-
growing companies with the potential to become significant players in the given market. 
Normally, these ventures are in need of capital that is far larger than their own sources 
and they are not able to attract this capital from other sources. 
To sum it up, VCs are specialised in the financing of innovative ventures and play an 
intermediary role minimizing asymmetric information and providing financial and non-
financial resources to generate added value and high returns.  
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According to Gompers (1993) the subcategories of venture capital are as follows: 
 seed/start-up financing 
 early stage financing 
 expansion/growth financing 
 later stage financing 
 
Figure 1: Start Up Financing and Development Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source. Smith and Smith (2000) 
 
Furthermore, the three main submarkets of venture capital are institutional venture 
capital, corporate venture capital, and informal venture capital. In this study, we focus 
mainly on institutional venture capital (also called ‘formal venture capital’). According 
to Mason and Harrison (1999), ‘the institutional VC industry comprises of full-time 
professionals who raise finance from pension funds, insurance companies, banks and 
other financial institutions to invest in entrepreneurial ventures.  
Andersen (2015) states that PE funds are characterised by their life-cycle, where, within 
a time period of 10 to 12 years, the management of the fund receives capital from external 
investors, which is invested in portfolio companies and finally exits the investments at a 
profit and returns part of it to the external investors.  
 
 
Idea Early stage Expansion stage Later stage 
Seed Start-up Expansion Public market Exit 
 Concept, product 
and team 
 Market launch 
 Setting up 
operations and 
sales 
 Growth and market expansion 
 Product and business development 
 Further innovation 
 IPO 
 Disposal 
 Turnaround 
Business Angels, Friends, Family, Fools 
 8FFF) 
Corporate funding and Venture Capital 
M&A and Alliances Mezzanine IPO 
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Figure 2: Players of the Private Equity Industry 
 
 
 Source. Andersen (2015) 
PE funds are normally run in the form of a limited partnership due to tradition and 
different law and tax advantages. External investors consist of institutions, firms and 
wealthy individuals. In a limited partnership, PE funds are general partners who control 
the fund’s activities, whereas the external investors are limited partners who does not play 
any role in the day-to-day management of the fund. PE fund, thus, act as financial 
intermediaries between external investors and private companies (Gompers, 1993). 
Venture capital firms act as active and temporary partner of the portfolio companies. 
While buyout funds usually take majority stakes in companies, VC funds normally prefer 
minority stakes. Venture capitalists benefit only from the profit reached by successful 
exits. Carried interest is paid to the venture capital firm if they are able to pay back the 
invested capital plus an annual internal rate of return. This is the reason fund managers 
tend to sell their stakes in portfolio companies as soon as they do not see any more 
potential to increase the value of the company.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
The detailed private equity life-cycle consists of several stages: 
 
Figure 3: Private Equity Life Cycle 
 
 
 Source. Smith and Smith (2000) 
 
2.1.4 The Development of Venture Capital Industry in the US 
The venture capital industry grew slowly and it was fragmented and geographically 
concentrated. Between 1946 and 1977 the money that flowed into the venture capital 
market have never overstepped a few hundred million dollars annually. At the end of the 
1970s, the venture capital could be described as ‘very small, homogeneous and weak in 
competition’. However, in the early 1980s, the venture capital industry rose enormously. 
This dramatic increase was triggered by the rise of investment opportunities and the 
introduction of tax-related incentives. After the end of the 1980s, the market consisted of 
almost 700 firms and a pool of more than $30 billion in 1989. The 1990s was driven by 
the new opportunities on the IPO market and the exit of many venture capitalists. In 2000, 
before the dot.com crash, the total money flow into venture capital reached an enormous 
$102 billion, and the average investment size was about $18 million. The bursting of the 
Internet bubble had an enormous effect on the venture capital market. The whole market, 
Fundraising
Deal 
origination
Deal 
structuring
Management 
and 
monitoring
Exiting
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both the number of venture capital firms and capital invested dropped immensely and 
substantially affected the behaviour of venture capitalists. (Landström, 2007) 
For the US venture capital market also took a few years to recover after the financial 
crisis. However, after the steep decrease in investment in 2012, venture capital investment 
activity recovered in 2013. High-level figures, successful fund closings, improving 
economic environment, and the rapidly improving exit conditions opened the way for the 
following years. An open IPO window hallmarked the recent years accompanied by 
advanced mobile technology which led to significant changes in various sectors. This 
implies that information technology continues to be the sector that dominates the venture 
capital market in the US. Globally, the US economy account for 68% of global venture 
capital activity which makes US the largest hotbed of the VC industry. Europe accounts 
for only 15% of global VC activity (Ernst &Young, 2014). 
 
2.1.5 The Development of Venture Capital in Europe 
According to Landström (2007), the intensive emergence of venture capital in Europe 
happened in the late 1970s. However, these companies were rather initiatives and 
organised venture capital was non-existing during that time. During the late 1980s a more 
significant venture capital market emerged driven mainly by the introduction of 
secondary stock markets in many countries. According to the author, the European market 
as a whole is not that much smaller than the US market. However, there are several 
similarities, but also many important differences, between the two markets. Meanwhile 
the US venture capital industry is considered as a sufficient source of capital for high 
growth ventures, in Europe the venture capitalists still has to prove their existence.  
Kaplan, Martel, and Stromberg (2007) and Hege, Palomino, and Schweinbacher (2005) 
reached the same result. There is a widely held perception that Europe is lagging behind 
the US in most dimensions with respect to the venture capital market. They show a 
significant underperformance of European venture capital. After the economic crisis the 
European venture capital market stabilised itself and in 2013 demonstrated high growth. 
The UK, Germany, France, and the Scandinavian countries are the dominant hotbeds of 
the region. 2013 also brought a shift in the European venture capital investment pattern. 
VC funds increased their participation in the early-stage ventures. More than a quarter 
(27%) of financing rounds were undertaken by business angels or incubators.  
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2.1.6 The Capital Market Based Financial System as the Foundation of VC  
According to Gilson and Black (1999), the United States has small banks that play a 
limited role in the governance of large corporations, and a well-developed stock market 
with frequent IPOs. In contrast, the European large banks play a larger role in monitoring 
firms. The US has a larger number of VC funds and the funds themselves are larger 
relative to Europe. In addition, US funds invest heavily in early-stage ventures and high-
technology industries, while European venture capital provides primarily later-stage 
financing in lower-technology industries. The authors argued that venture capital can 
flourish only if the venture capitalists can exit from a successful portfolio company 
through IPOs, which requires an active stock market. According to the authors, other 
countries failed to replicate the U.S. venture capital market because only a well-developed 
stock market permits venture capitalists to exit through an IPO. Moreover, the potential 
for exit through an IPO allows the VC and the entrepreneur to agree over control rights 
that is not easily duplicable in a bank-centered capital market.  
Booth, Junttila, Kallunki, Rahiala, and Sahlström (2006) find evidence that capital 
market-based financial systems are better in favour of the venture capital market than 
bank-based financial systems. Rajan and Zingales (2003) introduces the lack of 
transparency and high information asymmetries as main barriers of the venture capital 
market in bank-based financial systems.  
On the other hand, Axelson and Martinovic (2015) showed that for both Europe and the 
US probability of exit via IPO has gone down significantly and the time to IPO has gone 
up over the last decade. The authors argued that there is no difference in the likelihood or 
profitability of IPOs between European and US deals. They found the same success 
factors for both regions, mainly, experience and serial entrepreneurship.  
 
2.1.7 The Importance of Venture Capital 
Having introduced the development of venture capital, we highlight the importance of 
this asset class. Landström (2007) argues that in our modern world countries’ 
competitiveness is driven by their capability to innovate. In our ever-changing world large 
and established companies are not producing that much of innovation and jobs. In 
addition, the source of new technologies are companies that emerged in the last 20 years. 
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Policy makers in the US realised a long time ago that sustainable economic growth and 
creation of jobs can be reached only by flourishing entrepreneurship. In the recent years, 
all over the globe governments try to create policies and the right funding ecosystem, 
which can support directly or indirectly the venture capital industry and entrepreneurship. 
According to a research report, Ernst & Young (2013), the second most important funding 
source after bank credit are public aid and government funding programs. As a 
consequence, the society needs growth-oriented entrepreneurial ventures with 
knowledge-based and technological driven ideas. 
Smith and Smith (2000) argue that these ventures almost in all cases face the problem of 
raising capital for growth and gaining access to competence, experience, networks, and 
other resources that are sufficient for growth. This is the reason a healthy venture capital 
market is inevitable for growth-oriented ventures. They can provide capital, management 
skills, and other skills which entrepreneurs lack of.  It is assumed that the high level of 
the US venture capital market is one reason for the ability of the US economy to make 
high growth companies out of innovative ideas from universities and R&D arms. Google, 
Facebook, Intel, Microsoft, and Amazon.com can be mentioned as good examples. 
Bygrave and Timmons (1992) argue that the US venture capital market is perceived as 
the ‘gold standard’ of early-stage innovation finance system.  
Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Da Rin et al. (2006) regard venture capital as a significant 
vehicle for promoting successful new firms and the economy as a whole. Furthermore, 
the effect of venture capital activities has been found significantly positive on 
employment (Wasmer and Weil, 2000).  
 
2.1.8 Venture Capital and Value Added 
Venture capital funds seek to time fundraisings according to the arising investment 
opportunities and later they have to make good decisions about follow-on investments by 
continuously monitoring, advising, and assessing the portfolio companies. Finally, they 
seek to harvest their investments by choosing the best available exit route. Although 
evidence from studies suggests that VC involvement add value, it is unclear whether the 
benefits derive from their involvement or from their ability to select companies in which 
to invest. 
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Smith and Smith (2000) state that the ideal portfolio companies to venture capital funds 
are those in which venture capitalists can add significant value. Thus, venture capitalists 
usually specialise in certain industries, and they focus on different stage of development 
in different geographic area. Additionally, market conditions affect the dynamics of the 
industry, therefore, it can influence the activities and performance of funds. 
Venture capitalists may add value by selecting and monitoring portfolio companies or by 
providing advisory services to them. However, findings are mixed related to this 
statement.  
Gompers and Lerner (1999) state that venture capitalist are able to mitigate information 
asymmetries between investors and entrepreneurs. Additionally, close monitoring and 
motivation of management by VCs result in more success stories. Activities of venture 
capital firms may reduce volatility in returns through diversification and information 
problems by taking board seats and special rights. 
However, Barney, Busenitz, Fiet, and Moesel (1996) document that portfolio companies 
do not perceive much value added by being advised. In contrast, evidence has been found 
that venture capitalists promote innovation. In most of the cases venture capital 
involvement is associated with higher levels of patents.  
Venture capital can serve as certification factor in the IPO process since VC backing is 
associated with lower underpricing of IPOs and with lower total cost of going public. The 
topics underpricing and certification hypothesis is introduced and discussed extensively 
in the next sub-chapters. 
 
2.2 Exiting 
Andersen (2015) argues that private equity funds usually have a finite life-time of 10 
years in which they must find investment opportunities, carry out deals, monitor and 
create value add and exit their investments. The term “exit” refers to the divestment 
activity of portfolio companies which is the last stage in the venture capital life-cycle.  
Cumming (2010) argues as well that venture capitalists exit from their investments when 
the expected value added by another financing rounds is smaller than the costs. Factors 
that influence the exit decision of venture capitalists can be profitability, contractual 
arrangements and exit terms, actual market environment exit alternatives, and alternative 
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investment opportunities. The author argues that exit alternatives are a good indicator of 
the attractiveness and the development of the venture capital industry.  
 
Due to the special business model of private equity funds, general partners have to set up 
new funds once the previous one is about to be closed. One does not have to mention that 
only fund managers with sound track records are able to successfully raise subsequent 
funds. Logically, exits are probably the most important activity in the venture capital life-
cycle. 
Jenkinson and Sousa (2013) argue as well that the timing and the choice of a good exit 
strategy influence not only the return of the investment but has also an effect on investor’s 
track record, thus, on subsequent fund raising activities.  
Gompers and Lerner (2006) state as well that successful exits are critical for both ensuring 
high returns and raising capital. Put it another way, exiting is the crucial point of the cycle.  
As a good example can be mentioned the secondary markets developed by many 
European countries in the early ‘80s. After the 1987 market crash, IPO activity dropped 
rapidly and the European markets could not recover which left VCs without the option to 
take portfolio companies public and the market remained depressed. In the US, however, 
the IPO market recovered and VCs were able to raise new capital.  
 
2.2.1 Problems of Exiting 
Venture capitalists’ behaviour during the exiting process can sometimes bring about 
severe problems for entrepreneurs. As stated before, since venture capitalists are 
rewarded purely on exit proceedings, they seek to exit in the most profitable and fastest 
way. Additionally, exit results signal the quality of the venture capital firms. Thus, VCs 
might encourage portfolio firms to undertake actions that can support the success of a 
possible IPO regardless of the long-term effects of them. For instance, VCs might 
encourage management to cut vital research spending in order to increase earnings. 
(Smith and Smith, 2000) 
Additionally, VCs might take advantages of insider information and they might exit their 
investments, causing harm to other shareholders. (Smith and Smith, 2000) 
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Additionally, venture capitalists face not only the risk stemming from the founder’s 
attempt to develop a marketable product, but liquidity risk as well. It occurs when a 
venture capital firm is not able to exit its investment at all, or not at its fair market value.  
Another issue is the equal opportunities to exit investments. Interest in certain 
technologies by public investors appears to be concentrated. For example, public market 
focus has changed a lot in the recent past, from computer hardware, multimedia, to 
biotechnology and internet companies. Consequently, this phenomenon can lead VCs to 
invest more into ventures from hot industries. Hence, promising but not in the spotlight 
standing industries might attract insufficient capital. (Smith and Smith, 2000) 
Schwienbacher (2007) makes the academic knowledge more complex by analysing the 
relationship between the level of innovation and exit strategies of venture capitalists. The 
author finds that more innovative and profitable ventures are they are more likely to go 
public than ventures with more imitative products or services. In addition, it has been 
documented that IPO exit route is more preferable to founders. Hence, entrepreneurs will 
favour more innovative R&D project which can influence products and services of 
ventures. In addition, the author argues that exit decisions of VCs have two dimensions, 
namely, the type of the exit route and the timing of the chosen exit route of which both 
can affect the success of the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. Schwienbacher 
(2009) argues that venture capitalists take firms public in order to raise additional capital, 
and thus, to make themselves possible to successfully exit their investments. Therefore, 
stock market conditions are extremely important for them since their ability to time IPO 
exits are limited Schwienbacher (2009). 
 
2.2.2 The Importance of Financial Contract Design 
Financial contract design is a key mechanism in venture capital investments which can 
efficiently provide financing and, at the same time, reduce adverse selection and moral 
hazard issues. The ideal contract design provides an option-like payoff plan which is a 
desired risk-return profile for venture capital firms. Convertible securities meet perfectly 
the aforementioned requirements which offer protection against downside risk and secure 
substantial gains in case of an upside scenario. (Cumming, 2005) 
According to Kaplan and Strömberg (2003), US venture capital firms use extensively 
convertible preferred stocks. However, the use of convertible securities is relatively 
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limited in Europe, which can be explained by the different institutional frameworks 
(Schwienbacher, 2008). Interestingly, evidence shows that lack of experience and 
sophistication is not related to the level of use of these securities (Cumming, 2007).  
It can happen that the management does not want to sell their share at all at the time of 
the exit of the venture capital firm. This might be the case because management has 
various motives but venture capitalists aim only at reaching the highest return on 
investments. Therefore, it is highly recommended to inform the management about the 
possible exit scenarios and the timing of those at the time of investment. Venture 
capitalists include certain provisions, e.g. drag along or tag along rights, in the 
shareholder’s agreement that can oblige the management in such cases. In general, well-
managed co-ownership and the properly implemented incentive programmes for the 
managers are key elements of venture capitalists’ business model and they might ensure 
a relatively smooth exit. (Andersen, 2015)  
 
2.2.3 The Advantages and Disadvantages of Initial Public Offering 
According to Andersen (2015), going public means the portfolio company achieves a 
stock market listing and sells shares in the primary market that results immediate change 
in the ownership structure (usually a broader dispersion). Additionally, it ensures access 
to capital market financing in the future. Additionally, IPOs imply high degree of 
alignment of interest between shareholders because listing is regarded as success and 
management will typically retain their position in the company.  
Academic wisdom traditionally regards stock exchange listings as venture capitalists’ 
favourite exit from a portfolio company. For example, Gompers and Lerner (1997) and 
Amit et al. (1998) find that venture capitalists deliver most of their profits by IPOs. 
Additionally, Brau et al. (2003) document a valuation premium of 22% for IPOs over 
acquisition exits. Furthermore, Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) find that average annual 
rates of return to VCs are 84% in IPOs, and only 20% in trade sales. Gompers (1995) 
documents 60% average annual rate of return for IPOs and only 15% for trade sales. To 
further support this findings, Brau et al. (2003) document higher valuations with 22% for 
going public over trade sales.  
However, the bursting of the bubble has changed their strategies and there is no clear 
consensus on the favoured exit routes. Bessler and Seim (2011) also realise that IPOs are 
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not the most preferred exit routes of VCs from certain reasons. Da Rin et al. (2011) argued 
that IPOs were the most important exit route in the US until 2000, but their role has lost 
significance. Ball, Chiu, and Smith (2011) also reached the same result.  
 
Roell (1996) lists the advantages of public listings, namely, access to new financing, 
increased company image, increased motivation for employees and management. Hence, 
IPOs are incentives for all shareholders. However, IPOs are suitable exit routes only for 
companies that reached a certain value, position and attention on the market. Venture 
capital-backed firms are sometimes not able to fulfil the requirements for listing. 
Moreover, listings have a few disadvantages as well. For example, venture capital firms 
are usually not able to sell all of their stakes in the company upon IPOs since the market 
expects that major shareholders stay invested in the company signalling confidence. It is 
a best-practice from investment banks to apply a lock-up period of 6 to 18 months to all 
the existing shares which does not allow shareholders to sell their stakes during this time 
period. This obligation has clearly an effect on PE funds’ return. As further disadvantages 
can be mentioned that IPOs are lengthy and expensive processes and PE funds usually 
lose their preference rights after a listing. Finally, listing of a well-established mature 
industrial portfolio company is considered much more secure than listing of a small 
venture capital-backed technology firm.  
 
2.2.4 Alternatives for IPO 
Trade sale 
Academic research has shown that trade sale to a strategic or financial buyer is one of the 
most popular exits. Cumming (2007) argues that in a trade sale the VC stake is sold to a 
strategic investor in order to integrate the venture into the company. A strategic investor 
can benefit from the deal by gaining access to R&D, patents, and technology. If there are 
exploitable synergies or other benefits a trade sale might offer a more profitable exit than 
other routes such as an IPO. In addition, the success of a trade sale may be influenced less 
by actual market conditions than in case of an IPO.  
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Recapitalisation 
This type of exit uses borrowings to pay dividend to the investors, in this case the private 
equity fund. Larger companies might issue bonds and finance dividend payouts with the 
help of proceeds from this issue.  
 
Spin-outs and break-ups 
It includes dividing up companies and restructurings of portfolio companies in order to 
create or save value. 
 
Selling back to the entrepreneurs or the company 
If there is no potential buyer for the portfolio company fund managers might try to sell 
the shares back to the company or to the management. However, this type of exit is rare 
since most of the time the management does not have the financial resources to pay for 
the shares. A buy-back can be organised at the time of investment by using put option. 
This agreement makes shareholder able to sell the shares back to the management (put 
option) or to the company (redemption provision) on an agreed date and at an agreed 
price. Normally, it allows the fund manager to exit the investment and redeem the 
originally investment amount after a few years. Provisions like this are used to discipline 
the management if it does not cooperate with the investors. Conversely, the management 
might have the right to buy the shares back (call option). 
  
Sale of portfolio companies to secondary funds 
Since fund managers invest and sell companies cyclical it can happen that a portfolio 
company is really hard to sell. In those cases, the PE fund can sell shares in one or even 
in more portfolio companies to secondary funds which are specialised in acquiring stakes 
in portfolio companies from other PE funds.  
 
Liquidation or insolvency 
It can also happen that the portfolio company does not fulfil the expectation and the fund 
manager decides to liquidate the company.  
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2.2.5 The Role of Reputation in the VC Market 
Reputation’s effect on the ability to raise new capital is one of the major topics in 
corporate finance. For example, Diamond (1989) documents that reputation plays an 
important role in accessing debt and equity markets. Smith and Smith (2000) argues that 
an investor in limited partnership structure should be cautious because ‘At the beginning 
of a partnership the limited partners have all the money and the general partners has the 
experience, but at the end, the general partners has all the money and the limited partners 
have the experience.’ However, venture capital firms receive most of their capital from 
institutional investors who continuously monitor general partners. Not to mention, that 
reputation plays an important role as well. In order to operate successfully and raise funds 
cyclical, they have to find the best-performing ventures and carry out deals that are 
beneficial both for the investors and for the entrepreneurs. 
Smith and Smith (2000) also argue that reputation plays a role in most of the markets. 
Reputation of all parties, such as VCs, investors, end entrepreneurs, is substantial. For 
example, VCs prefer to raise money from institutional investors instead of individuals 
and well-established, serial entrepreneurs are able to raise capital faster and easier than 
first-time founders. Not to mention, that VCs with reputation are able to charge higher 
fees and carried interest due to the expectations that their overall performance will be 
higher than of other competitors.  
Megginson and Weiss (1991) document that VCs’ reputation might be guarantee for 
taking firms to the public market due to their experience and expertise related to IPOs. 
This implies that VCs own reputational capital and such a reputation is costly. Hence, the 
present value of lost reputational capital by taking firms with bad quality is greater than 
a one-time gain from such a movement. The authors state that staying invested before and 
after the IPO works as a bonding mechanism and support VC certification due to the fact 
that the VC could not benefit from higher share price over a short period of time.  
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2.3 Short-term Financial Performance of VC-backed IPOs 
 
Traditionally, scholars focus on the size of the underpricing and the long-run market 
performance when they examine the return and performance characteristics of public 
listing. Normally, underpricing is calculated as the difference between the stock price at 
the end of the first trading day and the offer price. The empirical findings of existing 
studies are introduced in this sub-section.  
 
Informational problems can arise times when private equity is offered to the public which 
is not specific only to the venture capital market. One of the most researched 
informational problems is the phenomenon underpricing. Academics find that IPOs are 
underpriced, on average, by about 16 percent (Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter, 1994).  
Generally, academic literature considers underpricing of IPOs as the existence of 
premarket information asymmetry and as a compensation of public investors. According 
to Rock (1986), underpricing is a discount which might be required by uninformed 
investors who face the problem of asymmetric information. Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) 
argue that underpricing can be viewed as a signal to public investors regarding the quality 
of the issue. Francis and Hasan (2001) describe this phenomenon as deliberate 
underpricing. However, Ritter (1991) documents IPOs with overpricing. Academic 
literature identifies several explanations, such as costly information acquisition, 
bandwagon effect, signalling, ownership dispersion (Ritter, 1995). 
However, venture capital investments are generally associated with high level of risk 
(Carleton, 1986). Additionally, VC-backed companies are being taken public at an earlier 
development stage than non VC-backed firms, which suggests that the level of 
information asymmetry is higher for venture-backed IPOs (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). 
Thus, higher underpricing should be expected for VC-backed public listings compared to 
non VC-backed ones.  
The role of venture capitalists in IPO processes are examined by several scholars, such as 
Barry et al. (1990), Lerner (1994), Megginson and Weiss (1991), Sahlman (1990) and 
Ritter (2012). Academics argue that venture capitalists are permanent IPO market players 
which can lead to less underpricing (Neus and Walz, 2005).  
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In contrast to the certification theory, it seems plausible that IPO firms are overpriced by 
VCs due to the fact that financial sponsors’ return are stemming from the difference 
between initial investments and exit proceedings. This theory is supported by the fact as 
well that venture capital firms have board seats, voting rights and other tools to influence 
the timing of an IPO.  
Additionally, Hadryd, Mietzner and Shciereck (2010) analyse underpricing and long-term 
performance of private equity-backed IPOs. The authors assert as well that information 
asymmetry plays an important role in the behaviour of market participants. Evidence is 
documented that VC-backed listings are associated with larger underpricing than buyout 
capital-backed listings. The finding has been explained by the fact that buyout funds back 
more stable and mature companies from established industries, whereas venture capital 
funds are engaged in a market with higher risk.   
 
2.3.1 Certification Hypothesis 
Third party certification imply value whenever securities are issued in capital markets 
and external investors have less information than insiders regarding the value of the 
offering firm. Since insiders tend to hide or distort information in order to maximise 
proceedings from the deal, public investors offer lower price due to information 
asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970). Hence, public investors are convinced “…that accurate 
information disclosure has occurred only if a third party, with reputational capital at stake, 
has asserted such and will be adversely and materially affected if that assertion proves 
false.” (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). 
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Source. Own creation 
 
 
According to Megginson and Weiss there are three conditions to be met by a third party 
to believe that the certification role has value: 
i. Reputational capital is at stake. 
ii. The present value of this reputation capital is larger than any one-time gain from 
certifying falsely. 
iii. Costly certifying services for the issuing firm.  
  
The authors argue that there are strong reasons to believe that these tests are met by 
venture capital firms.  
One would expect that venture capitalists are sensitive to any negative reputational effect 
that may occur by taking an overpriced firm public. Consequently, close-to-real-value 
offer prices and prudent behaviour should be observable for more experienced and 
reputable VC firms. Hence, one would expect lower underpricing and a superior long-run 
performance from venture capital-backed listings compared to non venture-backed IPOs. 
This is the certification of value theory (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). The authors find 
that venture capital-backed IPOs were less underpriced than non VC-backed IPOs during 
1983-1987. This finding supports the certification hypothesis, meaning that venture 
capital firms price IPO close to their intrinsic value.  
 
First-day closing price/Intrinsic value 
Underpricing for non 
VC-backed IPOs 
Underpricing 
for VC- 
backed IPOs 
VC offer price 
Non-VC offer price 
Figure 4: Illustration of the Certification Hypothesis 
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Figure 5: The Mechanism of the Value Certification   
 
Source. Own creation 
 
Clearly, venture capitalists can build up and maintain reputation by not selling extremely 
mispriced shares publicly. Reputation allows these venture capital firms to sell shares and 
redeploy human capital with less concerns related to negative market reactions (Lin and 
Smith, 1998). The authors document that more experienced VCs are more likely to 
decline taking a company public with underpriced shares. 
Bessler and Seim (2011) argue as well that involvement of venture capital firms at early 
stage could be a superior certification of the quality of the firm and its IPO. This would 
imply that venture-backed IPOs should result in smaller underpricing and better long-
term performance compared to non venture-backed firms. The authors examine European 
VC-backed IPOs and find that they outperform the market in the first and second years 
post-listing, but not for longer time period. However, there is no academic consensus 
regarding this statement. 
Barry et al. (1990) document that VC-backed IPOs were less underpriced than non VC-
backed IPOs between the time period 1978-87. The authors explain the outcome by the 
screening and monitoring theory. It argues that venture capitalists select high-quality 
firms and add value by monitoring them permanently. Hence, these activities should 
imply that venture-backed IPO firms represent higher quality than non venture-backed 
• VCs are 
reluctant to risk 
their reputation
Reputation
• IPOs are priced 
closer to the 
intrinsic value
Fair valuation
Less underpricing
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counterparts. Barry et al. also document that venture capitalists stay invested in the 
portfolio companies after an IPO, which is associated with better survival rate for those 
IPOs reached by giving strategic advice, increase visibility to institutional investors and 
to other interested market players.  
However, more recent papers showed different findings. Lee and Wahal (2004) find that 
VC-backed IPOs are more underpriced between 1980 and 2000. Loughran and Ritter 
(2003) reach similar results.  
Chemmanur and Loutskina (2006) approach the topic from a new perspective. 
Alternatively, Chemmanur and Loutskina state that there are three possible roles for 
venture capital firms in an IPO, namely, certification, screening and monitoring and 
market power. The authors argue that these roles might influence the post-IPO 
performance. The certification hypothesis states that venture capital firms are permanent 
players on the IPO market, thus, they are concerned about their reputation and they are 
more averse to overprice IPOs. The screening and monitoring hypothesis assumes that 
the venture capitalists are able to successfully screen and monitor portfolio companies 
which can result in taking public firms with higher quality. The market power hypothesis 
implies that venture capitalists’ objective is to obtain the highest price possible in these 
IPOs with the help of their ability to attract more attention among market participants. 
Hence, the market power hypothesis has substantially different implications regarding 
IPO pricing. It is asserted that the market hypothesis is being supported by the behavioural 
argument, that is, public investors are excessively optimistic about the future prospects 
of the IPO firms (Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004).  
The authors reject the certification hypothesis, while found evidence for the market power 
hypothesis and for the screening and monitoring hypothesis. Thus, IPO can result in 
higher valuations for the equity of these firms. Consequently, evidence suggest that 
venture capitalists are willing to obtain higher valuation due to their reputation among 
limited partners and entrepreneurs, which has a substantial effect on subsequent fund 
raising. This finding is consistence with the findings of Gompers and Lerner (1998).  
The results of the paper find that both venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs were 
overpriced at the time of IPO. Moreover, VC-backed IPOs are significantly more 
overvalued than non venture-backed IPOs, median overpricing of 59% and 28%, 
respectively. Furthermore, high-reputation venture-backed IPOs are more overvalued 
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than IPOs backed by low-reputation VCs. These findings clearly reject the certification 
hypothesis and support the market power hypothesis. Therefore, it seems venture 
capitalists attract high quality market players to the IPO. Finally, the authors also find 
that VC-backed entities had higher quality operating performance than non-sponsored 
entities that partly supports the screening and monitoring hypothesis. 
Neusand Waltz (2005) showed that VC sponsors have incentives to report the true quality 
of their portfolio companies during the IPO process. Hence, one can see that reputational 
risk might have an effect on valuation and on the underpricing of IPOs. 
Kraus (2002) tests the certification role in relation to IPO underpricing as well. Kraus 
argues that VC-backed IPOs are less underpriced than non-backed ones but within one 
month after the listing the underpricing disappears when controlling for hot markets and 
underwriter reputation.  
Surprisingly, scholars find evidence that VCs with higher level of reputation tend to 
undertake public listings with larger underpricing (Tyková and Walz, 2007). 
 
2.3.2 Grandstanding Hypothesis 
It is shown that venture capitalists might be associated with the phenomenon 
grandstanding which hypothesises that less experienced VCs might take portfolio 
companies public too early. They are willing to signal an appealing track record to attract 
capital. Consequently, young venture capital firms take portfolio firms public earlier than 
more established venture capital firms. The grandstanding hypothesis, introduced by 
Gompers (1996), states that venture capitalists may exit their investments in good market 
conditions which allows them to build up reputation and support fund raising. The author 
also shows that less experienced VCs are desperate to raise new funds shortly after IPOs.  
Although grandstanding can shorten the incubation period for portfolio companies, Hsu 
(2009) points out in his research that longer incubation period has several positive effects 
on performances of companies (more patents, above average operating performance 
subsequent to listing).  
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Source. Own creation 
 
In sum, VCs may manage two or three fund simultaneously, each raised three to six years 
after the previous fund. Institutional investors as limited partners do not participate in 
policy decisions, thus, assessing a venture capital firm’s ability is difficult. Therefore, 
limited partners must search for signals of ability. Gompers and Lerner (2006) find that 
successful exits are critical to venture capital firms since they have to deliver high positive 
return, which has immense effect on raising capital for future funds. Further academic 
results also suggest that the relation between IPO performance and ability of capital 
raising influences the incentives and actions of venture capitalists. Hence, grandstanding 
is another example how venture capitalists can behave opportunistically which might lead 
to decisions that are not in the best interest of their portfolio companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First-day closing price/Intrinsic value 
Underpricing of IPO 
backed by less 
established VC 
Underpricing of 
IPO backed by 
established VC 
Offer price backed 
by established VC 
Offer price 
backed by less 
established VC 
Figure 6: Illustration of the Grandstanding Hypothesis 
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Figure 7: Implication of the Grandstanding Hypothesis 
 
 
Source. Own creation 
 
Lee and Wahal (2004) introduce a variant of the grandstanding hypothesis. After 
analysing first-day returns of 6,413 VC-backed and non-backed IPOs from 1980 to 2000, 
they find larger average first-day returns for VC-backed listings. The authors also argue 
that venture capital firms have an incentive to underprice IPOs since the media attention 
around a successful listing enables them to raise more capital. Lee and Wahal prove this 
hypothesis by showing positive relationship between first-day returns and future fund-
raising by venture capital firms. The positive relationship persists even after controlling 
for the age, size, and history of the VC firm.  
Gompers and Lerner (2000) state clearly that grandstanding indicates that venture capital 
firms signal their ability to potential investors. This could explain why young VC firms 
bring companies public earlier than older venture capitalists in order to establish a 
reputation. Young venture capital firms have been invested in the portfolio company 
fourteen months less and hold smaller percentage equity stakes at the time of IPO than 
the more established venture firms. These portfolio companies are approximately two 
Effect of historical perfromance on the amount of capital raised is stronger 
for young VCs, providing them with greater incentive:
To bring companies public earlier
To hold smaller percentage of equity stake
To raise new funds closer to the IPO
To underprice IPO firms more
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years younger and more underpriced when they go public than companies backed by well-
established VC firms. The results further prove that the relation between performance and 
the ability to raise capital affects the incentives and actions of venture capital firms.  
Barry et al. (1990) also find that VCs with more experience are accompanied with smaller 
underpricing. Nahata (2008) documents that cumulative capitalization of IPOs of VCs are 
in relation with successful IPO exits.  
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3 Hypotheses 
Our paper focuses on the underpricing of VC-backed and non VC-backed IPOs in Europe 
and in the US. In this chapter, we introduce our hypotheses with which we try to predict 
the existence of differences regarding the aforementioned phenomena and geographical 
location. We base our hypotheses on academic theory and empirical evidence. 
3.1 Certification Hypotheses 
Academic literature tends to use information asymmetry as a starting point to explain 
underpricing which is considered as an effective way to convince external investors on 
the quality of an IPO. Empirical evidence shows that private equity firms are able to 
mitigate information asymmetry by their value added activities (Megginson and Weiss, 
1991; Brav and Gompers, 1997; Schöber, 2008). Hence, we believe that venture 
capitalists create a higher level of certification which can be seen as a smaller information 
asymmetry gap. Consequently, we predict that VC-backed IPOs are less underpriced than 
non VC-backed IPOs when shares are offered to the public. 
 
H1: Venture-backed firms present less underpricing at IPOs than companies that are not 
backed by venture capitalists. 
 
H2: Venture-backed IPO firms from the US present lower level of underpricing than 
European venture-backed entities.  
 
H3: VC-backed IPOs are underpriced more during hot market periods. 
 
H4: VC-backed IPOs are associated with lower firm age. 
 
H5: VC-backed IPOs are associated with smaller offer size.  
 
H6: VC-backed IPOs are associated with longer lock-up periods. 
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3.2 Grandstanding Hypotheses 
In our research, we try to analyse whether less experienced venture capitalists tend to 
undertake actions which could signal ability and improve track record. We expect that the 
phenomenon grandstanding exists in the venture capital industry which can be proved by 
our data set.   
 
H1: Less experienced venture capital firms take portfolio companies public with a higher 
level of underpricing. 
 
H2: Less experienced venture capital firms take portfolio companies public faster, and at 
an earlier stage of their development. 
 
H3: Less experienced venture capital firms take smaller portfolio companies public. 
 
H4: Less experienced venture capital firms benefit more from high-quality underwriters 
since these IPOs might be associated with more risk. 
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4 Sample and Methodology 
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive description of the process of the data collection 
and presents the chosen variables. We show how we match VC-backed IPOs with non 
VC-backed ones. In the next, sub-chapter, we analyse the time series of initial public 
offerings and the underpricing of our sub-samples. Finally, we present the tables of 
descriptive statistics of the chosen variables and describe the methodology of our study. 
 
4.1 Sample 
There is no strictly defined method on sample identification in academic literature. In this 
chapter, we introduce commonly used approaches and we include the description of the 
selection criteria and sources applied by us to identify our samples. Academics argue that 
the classification of private equity and venture capital entities and deals are challenging 
due to fragmented information and the unclear line between asset classes and deals 
(Muscarella and Vertsuypens, 1989; Cao and Lerner, 2006). Normally, industry 
publications, financial newspapers, IPO prospectuses and other financial databases are 
used for identification and classification.  
Consistent with a lot of empirical researches, which use US market data as benchmark, 
my research examines underpricing of the VC-backed IPOs in the US and in Europe.  
We use Bloomberg and Thomson One as the best available sources to undertake our 
research. We use these databases to list all public offerings which received venture capital 
funding and those which did not such. Additionally, the available information on the 
website of the stock exchanges, companies, EVCA, and NVCA provide us with useful 
information. 
Other IPOs backed by other types sponsors are considered as non-ventures-backed IPOs 
and are not distinguished from non-backed IPOs. We do so, because the focus of this 
paper is on venture capital, and analysing separately other types of private equity 
sponsorship would far exceed the scope of our research. This is clearly reflected by the 
large amount of existing academic papers about buyout funds and their activity. 
Moreover, we assume that buyout-backed IPOs are not much different from non-backed 
IPOs knowing that buyout funds bring more mature companies from established 
industries to public markets. 
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Our paper restricts the sample to non-financial, Western European and US-based 
companies which were taken to public between 2000 and 2015.  Western Europe includes 
the UK, France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Denmark, Cyprus, Finland, Portugal, 
and Malta. 
Having filtered the duplicate listings, we end up a sample of 4,452 IPOs. The sample size 
is an important part of this section. Looking at the other papers, we can realise that sample 
size can vary extremely from only 120 to more than 3,000. Our sample from the European 
region consists of 1,745 IPOs. As one could expect, the US sample, which includes 2,707 
records, is approximately one and a half times greater than the European one. The above-
mentioned procedure left us with a venture capital-backed IPO sample of 1,474 records. 
The European and the US sample consist of 265 and 1,209 records, respectively. 
However, sample size shrinks when we use initial returns, as the measure of underpricing, 
in our analyses. 
 
The time period is also a crucial point when it comes to data. We realise that there is lack 
of studies which investigate these IPOs around 2010 and onwards. Hence, a study like 
ours can bring new findings to the surface. As the beginning point of time, we choose 
2000 so that we can analyse a longer time interval and examine IPO waves and economic 
cycles.  
The first step is to gather Western European and US historical stock information and 
company information for non venture-backed IPOs from Bloomberg. We collected all of 
the initial public offerings, active and inactive, in the US and in Western European 
countries. Secondary issues, pending, withdrawn or cancelled IPOs cannot be found in 
our sample data. Records that are not involved with common equity issues are eliminated. 
Furthermore, the IPO firm should not be a unit offering, closed-end fund, or a real estate 
investment trust (REIT). As the next step, we derive Western European and US historical 
stock information and company information for venture capital-backed IPOs from 
Thomson One. Since the Bloomberg sample includes all IPOs, we had to exclude the 
venture capital-backed listings manually with the help of the ticker names. Companies’ 
balance sheet items and other financial data are downloaded in USD and in EUR, for the 
US and for Europe, respectively. Penny stocks, i.e., listings with less than 1 USD or 1 
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EUR offer price are also excluded. If records have zero or missing values for important 
variables we assume the data unreliable and exclude it from our analysis. IPOs with less 
than USD/EUR 5.0 million are also excluded from the lists. 
For each IPO, we collect information on net proceeds, the number of shares offered, filing 
date, effective date, company founding date, country in which the firm is headquartered, 
industry and sector, lock-up date and period, name of the stock exchange, offer currency, 
and share price for the first trading day. Our tests require special information on venture 
capital investments in IPO firms. We obtain these data from the Thomson One database 
on the number and names of venture capital firms with an investment in each IPO at the 
time of the offering, the date of the first financing rounds, the number of financing rounds 
before IPO, and the participating underwriters.  
Unless otherwise noted, for the reported statistics, tests and regressions we use variables 
that are trimmed at the lower and upper half percentile. 
 
4.1.1 Description of the European and US IPO Market 
The distribution of the number and the volume of the European IPOs throughout the 
chosen time interval on an annual basis are showed in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8: The Number and Volume of European IPOs by Years, 2000-2015  
 
 
Source. Bloomberg and Thomson One, own creation  
 
IPOs are divided by the type of sponsorship, namely, venture-backed listings and non 
venture-backed ones. Most visibly, the peaks around the financial crises are depicted. The 
development of the European IPO market is best characterised by two distinct time 
periods, so that it seems appropriate to divide our analysis into the following periods: 
2003 to 2007 and 2008 to 2015. However, it is interesting to see that 2000 and the 
following two years, when the dot.com bubble burst, was dominated by non venture-
backed listings. This could be explained by the fact that the European venture capital 
market still lagged behind the US and that the “new economy” and the global boom had 
a different impact on Europe. The first period of our analysis covers the time before 2007. 
After the recovery, in 2003, the venture capital market started to grow impressively, up 
to €73 billion at the end of 2006, which is as large as it was in 2000. After the peak, the 
number of total IPOs falls below 24 listings. The second market cycle shows slightly 
different growth dynamics with the number of IPOs strongly increasing in 2014. In 2015, 
nearly 20 European companies that were backed by venture capitalists went public.  
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The distribution of the number and the volume of the US IPOs throughout the chosen 
time interval on an annual basis are showed in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9: The Number and Volume of US IPOs by Years, 2000-2015  
 
 
Source. Bloomberg and Thomson One, own creation 
 
Most visibly, the same market developments can be recognised. We observe a large 
decrease regarding the number and volume of IPOs in the years after the dot.com bubble. 
In 2004, the number of IPOs increased up to 246. Surprisingly, there was no dramatic 
increase from that year on neither in the number of listings nor in volume. In the second 
period, both venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs increased steadily, up to nearly 
270 public listings. In 2015, there were 171 IPOs in the US of which approximately half 
of them were venture-backed deals.  
Looking at the graphs, it becomes clear that the relative size of the US venture capital 
market, represented by IPOs, are exceedingly larger than the European ones both in 
number of listing and in volume. Meanwhile, there is no substantial difference in non 
venture-backed IPOs between the two markets. Hence, our data is consistent with both 
the industry wisdom and empirical evidence.  
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Both graphs reflect that 2013 was a turning point in the venture capital market. Improving 
economic condition, increasing levels of liquidity accompanied by higher level of 
investor confidence, and more positive exit environment contributed to the increase of 
venture capital investments and exits for 2013 onward. 
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of IPOs according to industry classification, geography, 
and year. First of all, it is inevitable that the two regions provided approximately the same 
amounts of non VC-backed public listings throughout the years. Clearly, the same 
industries appear to be the favourable for IPOs, namely, communication, non-cyclical 
consumer, and technology industry. Surprisingly, industrial companies do not seek to go 
public in the US, however, in Europe more of these companies see public listings 
attractive. The VC-backed IPOs show similar distributions. In the US, the technology 
industry leads the list followed by non-cyclical consumer industry, which is driven by the 
biotechnology subcategory. In Europe, producers and service providers from the non-
cyclical consumer industry dominate the VC-backed IPO market. In sum, favourite 
sectors are overwhelmingly consumer products and services, and information technology. 
According to Ernst &Young (2015), consumer services have direct connection with 
consumers that provides fast feedback and path to value realisation. Clearly, this sector is 
more preferred in Europe. They find as well that IT is still the leading sector of venture 
capital industry, while health care investments are particularly popular in mature markets 
like Europe or the US.  
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Table 1: Distribution of VC-backed and non VC-backed IPOs 
Industry classification are taken from Bloomberg. Geographical distribution is created by the country of stock 
exchange in which the IPO happened. Sub-periods are created by us based on IPO market data. 
 
Panel A: Industry distribution of VC backed IPOs 
 Europe US 
Industry Non VC-backed VC-backed Non VC-backed VC-backed 
Basic Materials 64 
(4.37%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
29 
(1.97%) 
1 
(0.10%) 
Communications 274 
(18.78%) 
15 
(6.36%) 
219 
(14.88%) 
104 
(9.26%) 
Consumer, Cyclical 199 
(13.64%) 
23 
(9.75%) 
168 
(11.41%) 
68 
(6.06%) 
Consumer, Non-
cyclical 
345 
(23.65%) 
103 
(43.64%) 
564 
(38.32%) 
455 
(40.52%) 
Energy 105 
(7.20%) 
15 
(6.36%) 
100 
(6.79%) 
22 
(1.96%) 
Industrial 257 
(17.61%) 
17 
(7.21%) 
121 
(8.22%) 
24 
(2.14%) 
Technology 196 
(13.43%) 
63 
(26.69%) 
256 
(17.39%) 
449 
(39.98%) 
Utilities 19 
(1.31%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
15 
(10.19%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
Total 1459 
(100%) 
236 
(100%) 
1472 
(100%) 
1123 
(100%) 
Panel B: Geographic distribution of VC Backed and Non VC-backed IPOs 
Country Non VC-backed VC-backed Country Non VC-backed VC-backed 
US 1472 1123 Spain 24 7 
Britain 488 59 Portugal 6 1 
France 212 77 Ireland 13 2 
Norway 58 17 Switzerland 30 14 
Germany 253 29 Austria 26 4 
Italy 145 9 Greece 61 0 
Sweden 54 13 Denmark 21 7 
Finland 25 2 Belgium 28 16 
Luxembourg 9 0 Netherlands 25 6 
   Total 2950 1386 
Panel C: Time-series distribution of VC Backed and Non VC-backed IPOs 
 Europe US 
Year Non VC-backed VC-backed Non VC-backed VC-backed 
2000 352 6 (1.68%) 236 257 (52.13%) 
2001-2003 164 0 (0.0%) 169 115 (40.49%) 
2004-2007 583 170 (22.58%) 501 359 (41.74%) 
2008-2012 137 33 (19.41%) 228 197 (46.35%) 
2013-2015 240 56 (18.92%) 359 281 (43.91%) 
Total 1476 265 (15.22%) 1493 1209 (44.74%) 
 
Table 1 Panel B depicts the distribution of IPOs according to geographical location. Most 
visibly, the US dominate the IPO market in both categories. Unsurprisingly, the number 
of the venture capital-backed listings reflects the size of the entire venture capital markets 
in these two regions. In Europe, we can mention Britain, France, Germany and the Nordic 
countries as one of the most active IPO markets in both categories.  
Academic wisdom states that there are waves in IPO activity (Ritter, 1984; Lowry and 
Schwert, 2002). Table 1 Panel C presents the distribution of initial public offerings in 
time arranged by geography and type of sponsorship. Bessler and Seim (2011) also 
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analyse the European IPOs for different time periods which cover two market cycles. We 
also find that the number of IPOs in the different sub-periods follows closely the 
economic cycles which supports the view that IPO market moves with the economy. 
 
4.1.2 Description of the Level of Underpricing 
We have calculated the first-day returns for the US and European IPOs which present 
valuable information regarding our research. We test whether there are statistically 
significant differences in underpricing. For this exercise two-tailed t-statistics test and 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test are applied. The Mann-Whitney test compares 
the distribution of ranks in two groups. If we assume that both populations have 
distributions with the same shape, it can be viewed as a comparison of two medians. 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the underpricing characteristics of our 
samples and sub-samples. Panels A and B present median and mean statistics based on 
the full IPO sample. Table 3 shows only pair-matched underpricing characteristics. 
Following Lee and Wahal (2004), each VC-backed IPO is matched with a non VC-backed 
IPO by a two-digit SIC industry classification and offer size. Our underpricing 
characteristics are consistent with those of previous studies (Lee and Wahal; Loughran 
and Ritter, 2003), showing that our sample is similar to those used in these studies.  
The final sample consists of 175 and 957 VC-backed deals and 1,446 and 1,458 non VC-
backed ones in Europe and in the US, respectively. The average underpricing for Europe 
and for the US are 6.49% and 21.17%, respectively, with the medians being 3.89% and 
10.65%, respectively.  
As we have already mentioned, it is inevitable that VC-backed IPOs have a significantly 
larger role in the US IPO market. Only 10 percent of all IPOs are venture capital-backed 
in Europe, while this number is close to 40 percent in the US. Surprisingly, the mean and 
median initial returns for the two types of IPOs do not differ significantly. However, these 
values differ significantly for the US. Most surprisingly, the European IPOs are being 
underpriced around 6 percent, while public listings of non VC-backed and VC-backed 
IPOs in the US show 15.9 and 29.2 percent first-day returns, respectively. Hence, our 
findings regarding the US IPO market are similar to previous studies (Lee and Wahal; 
Megginson and Weiss, 1991), which find that VC-backed IPOs experience significantly 
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higher underpricing compared to non VC-backed offerings. As for the offering size, both 
in Europe and in the US the venture-backed IPOs are smaller in size, but they do not differ 
statistically. Not surprisingly, the VC-backed offers tend to be higher by €50 million in 
the US. The amount of ‘money left on the table’ represent the same characteristics that 
values of initial returns depict. We find that the average amount of ‘money left on the 
table’ for the full sample is €7.95 million and 32.90 million in the Europe and in the US, 
respectively. 
 
Table 2: Underpricing of VC-backed and non VC-backed IPOs 
First-day returns are calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer price to the closing price of the stock 
at the end of the first trading day. Following Lee and Wahal (2004), each VC-backed IPO is matched with a non 
VC-backed IPO by a two-digit SIC industry classification and offer size. Amount of money left on table is calculated 
as the difference between the first-day closing price and offer price multiplied by offer size. Tests of differences in 
initial return using use a difference in means t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test for testing medians. Difference in 
offer size and amount of ‘money left on the table’ are also presented. Medians are in brackets. Statistical significance 
is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. P-values for the statistical tests are in parentheses in the last 
two columns. 
 Full 
Sample 
 
Venture 
Capital 
Backed 
Non venture 
capital-
backed 
Difference in 
Means  
(p-value) 
Difference in Median 
(p-value) 
Panel A: Comparison of the European Sample of VC Backed and Non VC-backed IPOs 
Number of IPOs 
Percent of the full sample 
1621 
100% 
175 
10.8% 
1446 
89.2% 
- - 
Percentage of IPOs with 
positive initial returns 
72.3% 71.4% 72.4% - - 
Mean initial return (%) 6.49 
[3.89] 
6.05 
[4.00] 
6.55 
[3.84] 
0.49 
(0.8335) 
0.16 
(0.9841) 
Mean offer size (€ 
million) 
200.90 
[37.13] 
117.74 
[40.00] 
210.96 
[37.01] 
-93.22 
(0.2697) 
2.99 
(0.5141) 
Mean amount of ‘money 
left on the table’ (€ 
million) 
7.95 
[0.00] 
10.41 
[1.23] 
7.65 
[0.00] 
2.76 
(0.2482) 
1.23*** 
(0.0004) 
Panel B: Comparison of the US Sample of VC Backed and Non VC-backed IPOs 
Number of IPOs 
Percent of the full sample 
2415 
100% 
957 
39.6% 
1458 
60.4% 
- - 
Percentage of IPOs with 
positive initial returns 
75.7% 80.6% 72.5% - - 
Mean initial return (%) 21.17 
[10.65] 
29.15 
[15.56] 
15.92 
[8.07] 
13.23*** 
(0.0000) 
7.49*** 
(0.0000) 
Mean offer size (€ 
million) 
180.29 
[90.40] 
157.44 
[89.72] 
195.30 
[92.00] 
-37.86 
(0.1046) 
-2.28 
(0.5460) 
Mean amount of ‘money 
left on the table’ (€ 
millon) 
32.90 
[9.41] 
46.90 
[15.81] 
24.17 
[6.75] 
22.73*** 
(0.0000) 
9.06*** 
(0.0000) 
 
According to several academic paper (Megginson and Weiss (1991); Lee and Wahal 
(2004)), we also match the VC-backed IPOs to non VC-backed IPOs by offering size, 
and industry classification. Our matched samples show only a slightly different picture 
regarding underpricing. Consistent with the certification hypothesis, the average 
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underpricing for the European and the US VC-backed IPOs is 6.05% and 29.15% 
compared to -1.83% and 18.32% for the matched sample of non VC-backed IPOs, 
respectively, and the difference in initial returns is statistically significant for both 
regions. Most importantly, the European non VC-backed IPOs are overpriced on average 
and statistically different from the VC-backed ones. These findings are similar to the 
results of Megginson and Weiss but differ from the ones found in the study by Barry et 
al. (1991). As we expected, VC-backed firms are taken public with lower firm age than 
are non VC-backed entities, on average. Furthermore, mean length of lock-up periods 
tend to be shorter for venture-backed companies both in the US and Europe. 
Table 3: Underpricing of VC-backed and ‘Matched’ Non VC-backed IPOs 
First-day returns are calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer price to the closing price of the stock 
at the end of the first trading day. Following Lee and Wahal (2004), each VC-backed IPO is matched with a non 
VC-backed IPO by a two-digit SIC industry classification and offer size. Amount of money left on table is calculated 
as the difference between the first-day closing price and offer price multiplied by offer size. Tests of differences in 
initial return using use a difference in means t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test for testing medians. Difference in 
offer size and amount of ‘money left on the table’ are also presented. Medians are in brackets. Statistical significance 
is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. P-values for the statistical tests are in parentheses in the last 
two columns. 
 Full 
Sample 
 
Venture 
Capital 
Backed 
Non venture 
capital-
backed 
Difference in 
Means  
(p-value) 
Difference in 
Medians 
(p-value) 
Panel A: Comparison of the European Sample of VC Backed and “Matched” Non VC-backed IPOs 
Number of IPOs 
Percent of the full sample 
350 
100% 
175 
50% 
175 
50% 
- - 
Percentage of IPOs with 
positive initial returns 
74.0% 71.4% 76.6% - - 
Mean initial return (%) 2.11 
[3.66] 
6.05 
[4.00] 
-1.83 
[3.48] 
7.88*** 
(0.0052) 
0.52 
(0.3443) 
Mean offer size (€ 
million) 
115.57 
[41.30] 
117.74 
[40.00] 
113.40 
[42.86] 
4.34 
(0.8846) 
-2.86 
(0.3015) 
Mean amount of ‘money 
left on the table’ (€ 
million) 
14.63 
[0.88] 
10.41 
[1.23] 
18.85 
[0.74] 
-8.44 
(0.2481) 
0.49 
(0.2280) 
Mean firm age 20.13 
[13.10] 
13.33 
[8.25] 
26.92 
[18.15] 
-13.59*** 
(0.0000) 
-9.90*** 
(0.0000) 
Mean length of lock-up 
period 
0.82 
[0.00] 
0.55 
[0.00] 
1.10 
[1.00] 
-0.55*** 
(0.0000) 
-1.00*** 
(0.0000) 
Panel B: Comparison of the US Sample of VC Backed and “Matched” Non VC-backed IPOs 
Number of IPOs 
Percent of the full sample 
1910 
100% 
955 
50% 
955 
50% 
- - 
Percentage of IPOs with 
positive initial returns 
79.1% 80.6% 77.5% - - 
Mean initial return (%) 23.75 
[12.92] 
29.15 
[15.56] 
18.32 
[10.73] 
10.83*** 
(0.0000) 
4.83*** 
(0.0001) 
Mean offer size (€ 
million) 
149.66 
[93.84] 
157.44 
[89.72] 
142.40 
[94.88] 
15.04 
(0.4484) 
-5.16 
(0.1171) 
Mean amount of ‘money 
left on the table’ (€ 
million) 
35.80 
[11.39] 
46.90 
[15.81] 
25.98 
[9.00] 
20.92*** 
(0.0000) 
6.81*** 
(0.0000) 
Firm age 15.80 
[10.41] 
10.22 
[8.67] 
21.37 
[21.46] 
-11.15*** 
(0.0000) 
-12.79*** 
(0.0000) 
Length of lock-up period 0.90 
[1.00] 
0.84 
[1.00] 
0.96 
[1.00] 
-0.12*** 
(0.0000) 
0.00*** 
(0.0000) 
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Table 4 examines that level of underpricing according to backing in Europe and in the 
US. Most surprisingly, after the extreme levels in 2000, initial returns stabilised and show 
no substantial change throughout the sub-periods. Clearly, underpricing is larger for VC-
backed IPOs in both regions, which is not in favour of the certification hypothesis. 
Statistical t-tests, in most of the cases, present statistically significant differences between 
initial returns in the same IPO market cycles from both sides of the Atlantic. Finally, only 
in the period, from 2013 to 2015, we can find lower level of underpricing for venture-
backed firms compared to non-backed ones. 
 
Table 4: Underpricing of VC-backed IPOs by Geography 
First-day returns are calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer price to the closing price of the stock 
at the end of the first trading day. Following Lee and Wahal (2004), each VC-backed IPO is matched with a non 
VC-backed IPO by a two-digit SIC industry classification and offer size. Amount of money left on table is calculated 
as the difference between the first-day closing price and offer price multiplied by offer size. Tests of differences in 
initial return using use a difference in means t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test for testing medians. Difference in 
offer size and amount of ‘money left on the table’ are also presented. Medians are in brackets. Statistical significance 
is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. P-values for the statistical tests are in parentheses. 
Panel A: Comparison of the US and European Sample of VC Backed IPOs 
 Full 
Sample 
 
EU US Difference 
in Means  
(p-value) 
Difference in Median 
(p-value) 
Number of IPOs 
Percent of the full sample 
1132 
100% 
175 
15.5% 
957 
84.5% 
- - 
Percentage of IPOs with 
positive initial returns 
79.2% 71.4% 80.6% - - 
Mean initial return (%) 25.58 
[12.50] 
6.05 
[4.00] 
29.15 
[15.56] 
-23.1*** 
(0.0000) 
-11.56*** 
(0.0000) 
Mean offer size (€ 
million) 
151.30 
[85.68] 
117.74 
[40.00] 
157.44 
[89.72] 
39.70 
(0.3644) 
-49.72*** 
(0.0000) 
Mean amount of ‘money 
left on the table’ (€ 
million) 
40.17 
[10.07] 
10.41 
[1.23] 
46.90 
[15.81] 
36.49*** 
(0.0001) 
-14.58*** 
(0.0000) 
Panel B: Comparison of the average level of initial returns in different sub-periods (%) 
 Europe US Difference by 
geography 
Year Non VC-
backed 
VC-backed Non VC-
backed 
VC-backed Non VC-
backed 
VC-
backed 
2000 22.53 6.13 33.60 62.88 -11.07*** 
(0.0023) 
-62.75 
(0.1762) 
2001-2003 4.06 - 12.15 16.41 -8.09*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
2004-2007 -0.59 7.45 11.88 15.88 11.29*** 
(0.0000) 
-8.43*** 
(0.0002) 
2008-2012 3.17 6.15 11.23 16.15 -8.06*** 
(0.0000) 
-10** 
(0.0443) 
2013-2015 4.57 2.48 15.05 24.47 -10.48*** 
(0.0000) 
-21.99*** 
(0.0001) 
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4.1.3 Description of Variables 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for each of the variables we use in the analysis 
of the certification theory. Clearly, the level of initial returns on average are higher in the 
US than in Europe, 23.75% compared to 2.11%. The amounts of ‘money left on the table’ 
also support our finding that IPOs are more underpriced in the US. As we expected, 
average offer size is also greater in the US, which represents its global superiority. 
Furthermore, ability to bring a company earlier also reflects a well-functioning stock 
market. In our sample, Europe lags behind the US regarding this characteristic as well. 
Higher average length of lock-up period from the US seems to support the above-
mentioned belief, assuming that the use of lock-up period is a characteristic of superior 
stock markets. 
 
Table 5: Characteristics of the Variables 
First-day returns are calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer price to the closing price of the stock 
at the end of the first trading day. Amount of money left on table is calculated as the difference between the first-
day closing price and offer price multiplied by offer size. Offer size is the offering amount in € millions. 
Variable Symbol Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Obs. 
Panel A: European Sample 
Initial return (%) UP 2.11 3.66 95.71 -98.92 26.48 350 
Amount of ‘money 
left on the table’ 
MONEY 14.63 0.88 723.40 -86.03 68.26 350 
Type of backing TYPE - - - - - 350 
Offer size SIZE 115.57 41.30 3,328.23 5.00 278.70 350 
Age of IPO firm  
(year) 
AGE 20.13 13.08 216.00 0.08 22.78 350 
Number of IPOs NUMBE
RIPO 
134.15 151.00 338.00 9.00 56.12 350 
Hot market period MARKET - - - - - 350 
Length of lock-up 
period (in 180 days) 
LOCKUP 0.83 0.00 6.00 0.00 0.99 350 
Panel B: US Sample 
Initial return (%) UP 23.75 12.92 273.08 -29.55 38.21 1910 
Amount of ‘money 
left on the table’ 
MONEY 35.80 11.39 1,540.77 -67.19 100.54 1910 
Type of backing TYPE - - - - - 1910 
Offer size SIZE 149.62 93.84 16,006.88 5.78 416.05 1910 
Age of IPO firm 
(year) 
AGE 15.80 10.41 103.58 0.17 12.92 1910 
Number of IPOs NUMBE
RIPO 
112.68 91.00 228.00 9.00 64.43 1910 
Hot market period MARKET - - - - - 1910 
Length of lock-up 
period (in 180 days) 
LOCKUP 0.90 1.00 4.00 0.00 0.35 1910 
 
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for each of the variables we use in the analysis 
of the grandstanding hypothesis. Most important, the indicators of underpricing, namely, 
initial returns and amount of ‘money left on the table’ of VC-backed IPOs are at a higher 
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level on average in the US than are in Europe. Furthermore, European venture-backed 
firms seem to go public with lower firm age and after fewer financing rounds, based on 
sample means and medians. As we expected, offer size, length of lock-up period, number 
of funds, and capital under management are all greater in the US, which represents a 
superior venture capital industry. 
 
Table 6: Characteristics of the Variables 
First-day returns are calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer price to the closing price of the stock 
at the end of the first trading day. Amount of money left on table is calculated as the difference between the first-
day closing price and offer price multiplied by offer size. Offer size is the offering amount in € millions. 
Variable Symbol Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Obs. 
Panel A: European Sample 
Initial return (%) UP 6.05 4.00 40.32 -16.00 11.27 175 
Amount of ‘money 
left on the table’ 
MONEY 10.41 1.20 346.70 -86.00 36.22 175 
Age of IPO firm 
(year) 
AGE 13.33 8.25 216.00 0.08 20.83 175 
Time to exit EXITTIME 5.07 4.90 17.80 0.00 3.02 175 
Number of rounds ROUND 3.63 3.60 10.00 1.00 2.24 175 
Underwriter rank RANK 0.34 0.20 1.00 0.00 0.31 175 
Number of funds FUNDS 3.62 3.00 9.00 1.00 2.41 175 
Offer size SIZE 117.74 40.00 3,328.23 5.00 309.82 175 
Capital under 
management 
FUNDSIZE 373.75 300.00 8,447.04 5.87 272.28 175 
Length of lock-up 
period (in 180 days) 
LOCKUP 0.55 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.88 175 
Number of IPOs NUMBERI
PO 
129.41 151.00 338.00 9.00 55.56 175 
Hot market period MARKET - - - - - 175 
Panel B: US Sample 
Initial return (%) UP 29.18 15.56 273.08 -29.55 46.45 955 
Amount of ‘money 
left on the table’ 
MONEY 45.63 14.94 1,540.77 -67.19 
 
113.98 955 
Age of IPO firm 
(year) 
AGE 10.22 8.67 103.58 0.17 11.26 955 
Time to exit EXITTIME 5.87 5.00 31.10 0.20 3.87 955 
Number of rounds ROUND 4.76 4.75 10.00 1.00 2.44 955 
Underwriter rank RANK 5.81 6.61 9.20 0.00 3.60 955 
Number of funds FUNDS 6.57 6.00 33.00 1.00 4.01 955 
Offer size SIZE 156.83 89.72 16,006.88 5.78 554.20 955 
Capital under 
management 
FUNDSIZE 555.58 562.50 25,880.00 50.00 174.70 955 
Length of lock-up 
period (in 180 days) 
LOCKUP 0.84 1.00 4.00 0.00 0.44 955 
Number of IPOs NUMBERI
PO 
132.78 118.00 225.00 16.00 59.69 955 
Hot market period MARKET - - - - - 955 
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4.2 Methodology 
As most of the researchers, we are going to analyse underpricing as the difference 
between the offer price and the stock price at the end of the first trading day which is a 
standard event study methodology. Additionally, we measure underpricing by the amount 
of ‘money left on the table’. 
 
4.2.1 Underpricing 
Using underpricing as a measure of the economic role of venture backing, it is assumed 
implicitly that the closing price at the end of the first trading day is equal to the true value 
of the equity.1 
A common way to measure underpricing is to compute the difference between the offer 
price and the first-day closing price of the stock. One of the greatest disagreements among 
academics is the way one calculates the first day returns. Closing prices, bid prices, and 
bid-ask average price are found as valid methods. In our empirical analysis, we calculate 
the return of an investor who could buy share in the primary market and sells those shares 
at the end of the first trading day. Thus, underpricing for public listing can be calculated 
as the percentage change from the offer price Pi,OP to the closing price Pi,CP (Bessler and 
Seim, 2011): 
 
𝑈𝑃𝑖 =  
𝑃𝑖,𝐶𝑃−𝑃𝑖,𝑂𝑃
𝑃𝑖,𝑂𝑃
.          (5.1) 
 
The real loss in underpricing for the VC is that it transfers wealth from old shareholders 
to new ones. Alternatively, these costs related to IPOs can also be measured by calculating 
the incremental amount of ‘money left on the table’ in IPOs. Consistent with Loughran 
and Ritter (2002) we calculate this amount as the number of shares issued multiplied by 
the difference between the closing price of the first trading day and the offer price.  
                                                     
1 There are studies (Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004; Ritter, 1991; Morris, 1996; Duffle, Garleanu 
and Pedersen, 2002) that argue that this assumption might be violated while analysing underpricing because 
this price level shows overpricing and reflects mainly valuations of the most optimistic investors. However, 
in our study we assume that the closing price reflects the intrinsic value of the equity.  
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Thus, amount of ‘money left on table’ for an IPO can be calculated as follows: 
 
MONEYi =  (Pi,CP − Pi,OP)  × 𝑁𝑖,𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠         (5.2) 
 
, where Pi,OP and Pi,CP represent the offer price and closing price for the given share, 
respectively. Ni, Shares represent the total number of shares issued.  
 
Lerner (1994) and Ritter (1984) argue that equity issuing activities are volatile and, thus, 
hot and cold periods can be observed, where hot issue periods are described by high and 
ever increasing stock prices and a large and rising number of primary offers. On the other 
hand, cold issue periods are characterised by relatively low stock prices and less number 
of IPOs. Consequently, the equity issuing activity creates windows of opportunities. 
Yung, Colak, and Wang (2008) document that positive shocks to the economy raises 
overall growth projections, equity valuations and investor sentiment. As a result, low-
quality firms have the chances to go public with numerous good-quality firms. Hence, hot 
equity issue periods offer ideal opportunity to venture capitalists to exit from high- and 
low-quality firms as well.  
Ball et al. (2011) find that VC tend to take portfolio companies public when markets are 
high and turn to other exit routes when markets are falling. This phenomenon is called 
market timing, namely that issuers exploit hot market environment. Since this market 
behaviour raises adverse selection issues and uncertainty regarding the true value of the 
IPO candidate, issuing firms might be forced to accept higher level of underpricing. 
Moreover, underpricing seems to be larger during hot periods which, in turn, incentivise 
sponsors to exit at a later time. 
Lerner (1994) suggests that several factors can affect VCs decision when to bring firms 
public. One of these is the valuation level of publicly traded firms. The research shows 
that VC try to take firms public when valuations are high, and that experienced venture 
capitalists appear to be better at timing IPOs.  
Bessler and Seim (2011) argue that the success of an IPO not only depends on firm´s 
intrinsic value but size, liquidity, and quality of the given equity market. 
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Bessler and Kurth (2007) also find that market environments, i.e. hot or cold periods, can 
also influences price performance.  
Welch (1989) argues that a high level of undepricing of IPOs, which may be easier to 
carry out in hot market environments, might be seen as a positive act from the investors’ 
view.  
Therefore, consistent with Welch (1989), Ritter and Welch (2002), and Loughran and 
Ritter (2002), we examine the underpricing differential over more sub-periods due to non-
stationarity and whether hot market environment affects the level of underpricing.   
  
4.2.2 Certification Hypothesis 
 
The implication of the certification hypothesis is that the level of underpricing should be 
less for VC-backed IPOs than non VC-backed ones. That is, if venture capitalists are able 
to mitigate information asymmetry, the level of compensation that external investors 
require should be lower. 
 
Consistent with Megginson and Weiss (1991), our basic empirical model looks as 
follows: 
 
𝑈𝑃𝑖 = 𝐶 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +𝛽3𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐵𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 +
 𝛽6 𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑈𝑃 + 𝜖𝑖           (5.3) 
 
, where i refers to the IPO, C to the constant term, and ε is the error term. 
 
We study the relationship of initial returns and amount of ‘money left on the table’ to the 
following variables: 
i. A dummy variable (TYPE) for whether the IPO is VC-backed. The level of 
underpricing should be lower for VC-backed offers (TYPE=1) than for non VC-
backed offers (TYPE=0). Therefore, we expect negative relation between the 
dummy variable and the dependent variables. 
ii. The natural log of the offering amount (LOGSIZE). Ritter (1984) document that 
initial returns are significantly related to offering size. With this variable we 
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control for size. From the certification theory’s view, the coefficient of this 
variable should be negative and insignificant.  
iii. The age of the firm (AGE). It works as a control for the degree of information 
asymmetry. Similar to Megginson and Weiss (1991) we expect a negative 
relationship between initial returns and age, which implies that older firms are 
associated with lower level of information asymmetry. We define company age 
as the time between the incorporation date of the IPO firm and the date of the 
IPO. 
iv. The total number of IPOs in the year of the given IPO (NUMBERIPO). The total 
number of listings can be an accurate proxy of the IPO market’s activity in the 
given year. With this variable we control for the change in IPO market activity.  
v. The time span of our sample is 2000 to 2015 which includes two market cycles 
based on our analysis. We consider the time intervals 2004-2007 and 2013-2015 
as hot market periods, which might have caused structural changes to our model. 
Therefore, in order to have deeper insight on the behaviour of the model in these 
specific periods, and to test for the significance of the changes brought by the hot 
market periods, we introduce a dummy variable (MARKET). Hence, MARKET 
assumes a value of 1 from 2004 until 2007 or from 2013 until 2015 and zero 
otherwise. 
vi. The length of the lock-up period (LOCKUP). Lock-up periods are normally 
required by investment banks to signal quality and commitment. They further 
prolong the investment period of a VC, which can work as a counterforce to 
underpricing. Hence, we expect negative and significant relationship. Lock-up 
period is normally defined in days but most of the time they represent a half or 
one year. Therefore, we introduce a unit measure in which 180 days represent 
one unit.      
 
As we explained above, there is strong evidence that cyclical movement of the IPO market 
can cause structural changes, thus, influencing the pricing of listings. Therefore, in order 
to obtain a profound insight how hot market periods might change the behaviour of 
market participants, we create interaction variables with the help of the dummy variable 
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MARKET. By introducing these new variables, we are able to estimate the coefficients 
for all the explanatory variables in the hot market periods. 
Similarly, we analyse the structural changes that VC backing might bring to IPOs. 
Therefore, we introduce new interaction variables using the dummy variable TYPE.  
 
Hence, our model changes as follows:  
 
𝑈𝑃𝑖 = 𝐶 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +𝛽3𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐵𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 +
 𝛽6 𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑈𝑃 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇+ 𝛽9𝐴𝐺𝐸 ∗
𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 + 𝛽10𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐵𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 + 𝛽11 𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑈𝑃 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 + 𝜖𝑖  (5.4) 
 
𝑈𝑃𝑖 = 𝐶 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +𝛽3𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐵𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 +
 𝛽6 𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑈𝑃 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 ∗ 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸 + 𝛽8𝐴𝐺𝐸 ∗ 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸 +𝛽9𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐵𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂 ∗ 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸 +
𝛽10𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 ∗ 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸 + 𝛽11 𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑈𝑃 ∗ 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸 + 𝜖𝑖      (5.5) 
 
Tests of the certification hypothesis are presented in the next chapter. 
 
4.2.3 Grandstanding Hypothesis 
 
We hypothesise that VCs have different abilities to select or create portfolio companies 
that have high chances to go public. As we stated before, they can signal their ability most 
effectively by successfully exiting, i.e., taking portfolio companies public. 
If there is a common belief that high-ability venture capitalists are more likely to nurture 
potential IPO candidates, then undertaking flotation can be interpreted as a sign of having 
the ability to finance high potential ventures. Additionally, a successful IPO by a young 
VC can affect external investors’ belief in a positive way more than for a more established 
VC. Old venture capitalists do not need to signal ability since they showed evidence over 
many years (Lee and Wahal, 2004). 
In sum, each additional IPO undertaken by a young VC attracts more capital for it than it 
does for older VCs. Thus, old VCs do not rush to raise new funds subsequent to public 
listings. All of these hypotheses are consistent with industry wisdom. Muscarella and 
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Vetsuypens (1989) also document that older the firm is at public listing, the lower is the 
return on the first trading day. 
From these reasons, we believe that young venture capital firms tend to have shorter 
relationship with their portfolio companies which have been taken public.  
 
Our basic empirical model looks as follows2: 
 
𝑀𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑌𝑖 = 𝐶 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑋𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸 +𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑆 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑆 +
 𝛽6 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽7 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑈𝑃 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑆 + 𝛽10𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 + 𝛽11(𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 +
𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿) + 𝛽12(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿) + 𝜖𝑖       (5.6) 
 
, where i refers to the IPO, C to the constant term, and ε is the error term. 
 
Consistent with Lee and Wahal (2004), we study the relationship of initial returns and 
amount of ‘money left on the table’ to the following variables3: 
i. The average capital under management of venture capital firms (FUNDSIZE). 
We believe this variable is a robust proxy for VC’s reputation. Thus, this variable 
is our primary explanatory variable, since the grandstanding hypothesis asserts 
that VCs with less experience, i.e. with less reputation, underprice IPOs in order 
to become associated with successful exits. Hence, they are able to raise more 
capital for their subsequent funds. We anticipate negative and significant relation 
to the dependent variables.  
ii. A dummy variable that controls for VC reputation (SMALL). It represents IPOs, 
where the average capital under management of all the venture capital firms 
involved in a given IPO is below €300 million and $400 million in Europe and in 
the US, respectively. With this explanatory dummy variable, we measure whether 
there is any difference regarding underpricing between venture capitalists with 
low and high reputation. We believe there is a need to separate VCs with two 
different limits for these two regions due to the relative market size difference.  
                                                     
2 The explanatory variables SIZE and FUNDS, and ROUNDS and FUNDS for the European sample are 
moderately correlated, 0.39 and 0.34, respectively. Therefore, we present them together in the equation 
only for illustration purposes. 
3 Explanatory variables introduced in the previous sub-chapter are not listed here, even though they are 
used in testing the grandstanding hypothesis. 
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iii. The time to IPO (EXITTIME). We define exit time to IPO as the time span 
between the date of the first investment received by the portfolio company and 
its IPO. Since information asymmetry may be higher for portfolio companies 
taken public at their earlier development stage, we expect negative relation to the 
dependent variables.   
iv. The number of financial rounds before the IPO (ROUNDS). Introducing this 
variable, we intend to further measure the possible role of information asymmetry 
in venture-backed public listings. We conjecture that more financial rounds might 
be a proxy for quality, since raising venture capital is relatively difficult due to 
the thorough due diligence of VCs. We anticipate a negative relationship as well.  
v. The number of venture capital funds backing the IPO firm (FUNDS). The 
reasoning and our expectation regarding this variable are similar to the previous 
one.  
vi. The quality of underwriter (RANK). Following Gompers (1996) we also include 
underwriter rank as a control variable. With the help of this variable we separate 
the effect of venture capital backing from the quality of the underwriter. For the 
European sample we use the ranking list created by Migliorati and Vismara 
(2014). The US underwriter rankings are based on the wide-spread Carter-
Manaster (1990) ranking. They range in value from 0 to 1 and 0 to 9, respectively, 
with higher values indicating higher quality rankings. We expect that underwriter 
quality certify the IPOs as well, thus, we expect negative relation to initial returns.  
vii. As we previously mentioned, the grandstanding hypothesis asserts that less 
established venture capital firms might be associated with higher level of 
underpricing since they benefit relatively more from such an undertaking than 
well-established counterparts. Therefore, we include interaction variables to 
measure any characteristics that could be associated only with low-reputation 
VCs (RANK+SMALL, and SIZE+SMALL). 
 
Therefore, to test the grandstanding hypothesis, we divide the VC-backed IPOs into two 
groups with respect to the venture capitalists’ asset size. As we stated before, we 
download information on venture capital firms from the database Thomson ONE. The 
first group consists of IPOs backed by venture capital firms with less experience, 
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meanwhile, the second group includes the well-established VCs. In contrast to Gompers 
(1996), we use the total amount of capital managed as a proxy for reputation instead of 
firm age. We argue that capital under management is also an effective proxy for reputation 
because reputational effects should be captured by it. The more capital is under 
management, the better the venture capital firm is in fundraising. 
IPOs are classified as less experienced with an average amount of capital under 
management below €300 million/$400 million and as more experienced with larger than 
€300 million/$400 million. 
As a firm approaches IPO, it must hire at least one underwriter to manage certain tasks 
related to this event, such certifying prospectus and other filing documents, and raising 
visibility and interest among investors in a “road show”. Megginson and Weiss (1991) 
assert that it is possible that VCs have built relationships with underwriters in the past 
due to previous involvement of public listings. Consequently, VCs should attract higher 
quality underwriters which further lower the cost of due diligence, protect VCs’ 
reputational capital and provide them with increased access to institutional investors. 
Similar to their findings we also find that VC-backed IPOs are accompanied by 
underwriters with higher ranking than non VC-backed offers.  
Table 7 presents summary information for the IPOs backed by well-established and less 
experienced VCs. Most important, less-experienced VCs raise subsequent funds 
significantly faster post-IPO (an average of 17.01 months after IPO and average of 19.10 
months, respectively). However, this difference in the US is not statistically significant. 
The average time to exit and the average firm age further support the grandstanding 
hypothesis. Furthermore, less experienced venture capital firms bring to market IPOs that 
are more underpriced. The average initial return is 7.82% for IPOs backed by smaller 
VCs versus 4.82% for larger ones. As expected, experienced venture capital firms tend to 
use higher-quality underwriters both in Europe and in the US since they may have built 
strong relationships with established underwriters through previous IPOs. 
In sum, these summary statistics are consistent with the grandstanding hypothesis. 
Smaller VCs take portfolio companies public earlier and bear the cost of greater 
underpricing. 
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Table 7: Characteristics of IPOs backed by experienced and less-experienced VC 
firms 
Sample is 175 and 956 venture backed listings from Europe and from the US, respectively. P-values of significance 
tests for differences in averages are in parentheses. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and 
*** at 1%. 
 Below €300m/$400m 
under management on 
average 
300m/$400m or more 
under management on 
average 
Difference 
(p-value) 
 Europe US Europe US Europe US 
Average time from IPO date 
to next follow-on fund in 
months 
17.01 17.61 19.10 18.35 -2.09 
(0.1156) 
-0.74*** 
(0.0000) 
Average initial return at the 
IPO date 
7.82 41.05 4.82 22.26 3.00 
(0.2456) 
18.79 
(0.6793) 
Average amount of ‘money 
left on the table’ 
42.83 67.07 94.69 33.11 -51.86 
(0.9119) 
33.96 
(0.8991) 
Average offering size in 
millions 
116.39 157.97 118.69 156.17 -2.3*** 
(0.0001) 
1.8*** 
(0.0000) 
Average underwriter rank 0.30 6.21 0.38 5.50 -0.08*** 
(0.0002) 
0.71 
(0.2023) 
Average time to exit in 
years 
5.19 5.87 5.06 5.88 0.13*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.01*** 
(0.0000) 
Average age of issuing firm 
at IPO date in years 
12.36 10.13 14.02 10.28 -1.66 
(0.1563) 
-0.15*** 
(0.0003) 
Average number of 
financing rounds prior IPO 
3.94 4.8 3.41 4.73 0.53*** 
(0.0019) 
0.007*** 
(0.0000) 
Average number of VC 
funds involved 
4.08 6.52 3.30 7.65 0.78*** 
(0.0000) 
-1.13*** 
(0.0000) 
Average amount of 
accumulated investment 
prior IPO in millions 
69.06 150.27 31.71 111.46 37.35 
(0.2677) 
38.81 
(0.3552) 
Average length of lock-up 
period in 180 days 
0.6 0.81 0.52 0.85 0.08 
(0.1256) 
-0.04* 
(0.0885) 
Number 72 353 103 603 - - 
 
Tests of the grandstanding hypothesis are presented in the next chapter. 
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5 Empirical Results and Analysis 
 
In our empirical analysis, we investigate the level of the underpricing and its relation to 
other factors. In section 6.1 and 6.2, we study whether the two main hypotheses are 
supported by the short-term performance characteristics of VC-backed and non VC-
backed IPOs.  
 
5.1 Certification Hypothesis 
The testable implications of the certification hypothesis are that the level of underpricing 
and the amount of offer size and the age of IPO firm will be less for VC-backed firms 
than non VC-backed entities. As we introduced in earlier sections, venture capitalists 
might be able to reduce information asymmetry. 
 
5.1.1 The European IPO Market 
 
Table 8 provides evidence against the above-mentioned hypothesis. Initial returns are 
calculated as the percentage change between offer price and first-day closing price.  
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Table 8: European Initial Returns of the Matched Sample 
Multivariate Tests 
First-day returns are calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer price to the closing price of the stock 
at the end of the first trading day. Following Lee and Wahal (2004), each VC-backed IPO is matched with a non 
VC-backed IPO with the same 2-digit SIC industry code and with the closest offer size. The dummy variable TYPE 
shows whether the IPO is VC-backed (VC-backed = 1, non VC-backed = 0). LOGSIZE explanatory variable is the 
natural log of offer size in € million. Firm age is calculated as the time span between foundation and IPO date in 
years. The dummy variable MARKET shows whether a given IPO has taken place in the time intervals either 2004-
2007 or 2013-2015. Lock-up periods are calculated as units where one unit reflects 180 days. Statistical significance 
is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Standard deviations are presented in brackets. In regression (6) 
and (7) first we show the coefficients of the variables and then below we present the coefficients of the interaction 
variables created with the help of dummy variables MARKET and TYPE, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: Initial return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept -12.52** 
[5.077] 
-8.93* 
[5.302] 
-12.43** 
[6.091] 
-12.19** 
[6.181] 
-7.24 
[6.177] 
-10.20 
[8.225] 
 
-4.42 
[9.591] 
TYPE 8.20*** 
[2.790] 
6.28** 
[2.906] 
6.54** 
[2.913] 
6.49** 
[2.924] 
3.53 
[2.958] 
5.79 
[4.497] 
2.05 
[12.039] 
TYPE+MAR
KET 
- - - - - 1.71 
[6.140] 
- 
LOGSIZE 2.73** 
[1.195] 
2.79** 
[1.189] 
2.65** 
[1.194] 
2.64** 
[1.197] 
3.04** 
[1.176] 
3.69** 
[1.615] 
2.72 
[1.768] 
LOGSIZE+M
ARKET 
- - - - - -0.61 
[2.364] 
- 
LOGSIZE+T
YPE 
- - - - - - -0.57 
[2.423] 
AGE - -0.14** 
[0.064] 
-0.14** 
[0.064] 
-0.14** 
[0.064] 
-0.13** 
[0.063] 
-0.15 
[0.104] 
-0.23*** 
[0.086] 
AGE+MARK
ET 
- - - - - 0.05 
[0.130] 
- 
AGE+TYPE - - - - - - 0.24* 
[0.127] 
NUMBERIP
O 
- - 0.03 
[0.025] 
0.03 
[0.026] 
0.03 
[0.025] 
0.05* 
[0.028] 
0.04 
[0.034] 
NUMBERIP
O+MARKET
+TYPE 
- - - - - -0.18** 
[0.073] 
- 
NUMBERIP
O 
- - - - - - -0.03 
[0.052] 
MARKET - - - -0.70 
[2.912] 
0.09 
[2.858] 
19.45 
[15.070] 
2.63 
[4.145] 
MARKET+T
YPE 
- - - - - - -2.34 
[5.932] 
LOCKUP - - - - -5.69*** 
[1.427] 
-10.76*** 
[2.150] 
-8.23*** 
[1.936] 
LOCKUP+M
ARKET 
- - - - - 8.66*** 
[2.954] 
- 
LOCKUP+T
YPE 
- - - - - - 5.88* 
[3.035] 
R-squared 0.036 0.050 0.054 0.054 0.096 0.137 0.117 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.031 0.042 0.043 0.040 0.080 0.109 0.088 
F-statistic 6.612 6.100 4.918 3.936 6.072 4.891 4.075 
Prob. 
(F-statistic) 
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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The results in Table 8 seem to support the inverse of value certification hypothesis. In all 
equations, the coefficient associated to the dummy variable TYPE is either positive and 
significant or not statistically significant, when lock-up period variable is included (5 to 
8). Surprisingly, the offer size is positive and statistically significant which indicates that 
size of IPO deals heightens underpricing, which contrasts our expectations. The 
coefficient means that each additional percentage increase in offer size translates into 
roughly 3 percentage point change in initial return.  
Similar to Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989), we also find that there is a statistically 
significant relationship between the age of the IPO firm and its initial return. This 
phenomenon exists, supposedly, due to the higher amount of information available on 
older companies. We find that this effect is almost twice as much stronger for venture-
backed IPOs than for other ones, although size of the effect is considerably small. 
Furthermore, the variable that controls for the number of IPOs in a year (NUMBERIPO) 
is not significant, except during hot market periods when it reduces underpricing. The 
dummy variable MARKET, which controls for the IPOs that had occurred in the periods 
2004-2007 and 2013-2015, is also not significant. Finally, the coefficient associated to 
the length of the lock-up period (LOCKUP) is negative and statistically significant which 
confirms the existing signalling effect of lock-up periods. Surprisingly, among VC-
backed IPOs lock-up periods seem to have reverse effect which is contrast academic 
literature and wisdom. 
 
We also regress the same model using as dependent variable the amount of ‘money left 
on the table’. Since the correlation between initial returns and amount of ‘money left on 
the table’ are low4, we believe using another dependent variable makes our analysis more 
robust. Table 9 presents the results of these regressions. Most interestingly, the coefficient 
associated to VC-backed IPO (TYPE) is negative, although statistically significant only 
in equations 5 and 6, which suggests that VC investors leave less money on the table than 
do non-VC investors. Furthermore, offer size is significant at conventional levels in this 
case as well. Moreover, the variable AGE has exactly the same effect on our alternative 
dependent variable as we find in the previous regressions, which confirms the hypothesis 
that old firm face lower asymmetric information problems. Surprisingly, the coefficient 
                                                     
4 Correlations in Europe and in the US are 0.36 and 0.14, respectively. 
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associated to the variable NUMBERIPO is positive and statistically significant in this 
case which has the implication that underpricing tend to be higher in years with more 
IPOs. Finally, the coefficients of variables MARKET and LOCKUP are negative and 
significant. The negative sign of the former variable contrast the academic literature since 
initial returns tend to rise during hot market periods.  
 
Table 9: Amount of ‘money left on the table’ of the European Matched Sample 
Multivariate Tests 
Amount of ‘money left on the table’ is calculated as the price difference between offer price and first-day closing 
price of the stock multiplied by the number of shares issued. Following Lee and Wahal (2004), each VC-backed IPO 
is matched with a non VC-backed IPO with the same 2-digit SIC industry code and with the closest offer size. The 
dummy variable TYPE shows whether the IPO is VC-backed (VC-backed = 1, non VC-backed = 0). LOGSIZE 
explanatory variable is the natural log of offer size in € million. Firm age is calculated as the time span between 
foundation and IPO date in years. The dummy variable MARKET shows whether a given IPO has taken place in the 
time intervals either 2004-2007 or 2013-2015. Lock-up periods are calculated as units where one unit reflects 180 
days. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Standard deviations are presented 
in brackets. In regression (6) and (7) first we show the coefficients of the variables and then we present the coefficients 
of the interaction variables created with the help of dummy variables MARKET and TYPE, respectively.   
  Dependent variable: Amount of ‘money left on the table’ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept -47.78*** 
[12.734] 
-40.92*** 
[13.336] 
-65.21*** 
[15.122] 
-56.58*** 
[15.073] 
-51.13*** 
[15.339] 
-57.35*** 
[20.606] 
-66.18*** 
[23.566] 
TYPE -6.44 
[6.996] 
-10.10 
[7.309] 
-8.30 
[7.231] 
-10.06 
[7.130] 
-13.33* 
[7.344] 
-24.83** 
[11.266] 
24.80 
[29.582] 
TYPE+MA
RKET 
- - - - - 22.38 
[15.376] 
- 
LOGSIZE 17.02*** 
[2.997] 
17.13*** 
[2.990] 
16.19*** 
[2.964] 
15.68*** 
[2.919] 
16.13*** 
[2.920] 
21.90*** 
[4.047] 
16.28*** 
[4.345] 
LOGSIZE+
MARKET 
- - - - - -13.65** 
[5.923] 
- 
LOGSIZE+
MARKET 
- - - - - - -1.83 
[5.953] 
AGE - -0.27* 
[0.161] 
-0.27* 
[0.158] 
-0.25 
[0.156] 
-0.24 
[0.155] 
-0.58** 
[0.259] 
-0.37* 
[0.212] 
AGE+MAR
KET 
- - - - - 0.59* 
[0.326] 
- 
AGE+TYP
E 
- - - - - - 0.41 
[0.314] 
NUMBERI
PO 
- - 0.20*** 
[0.062] 
0.26*** 
[0.063] 
0.25*** 
[0.063] 
0.23*** 
[0.069] 
0.43*** 
[0.085] 
NUMBERI
PO+MARK
ET 
- - - - - -0.14 
[0.183] 
- 
NUMBERI
PO+TYPE 
- - - - - - -0.43*** 
[0.127] 
MARKET - - - -25.17*** 
[7.101] 
-24.29*** 
[7.096] 
24.70 
[37.757] 
-32.26*** 
[10.186] 
MARKET+
TYPE 
- - - - - - 26.07* 
[14.576] 
LOCKUP - - - - -6.27* 
[3.545] 
-7.93 
[5.388] 
-8.40* 
[4.758] 
LOCKUP+
MARKET 
- - - - - 2.17 
[7.400] 
- 
LOCKUP+
TPYE 
- - - - - - 5.83 
[7.456] 
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R-squared 0.088 0.096 0.123 0.154 0.161 0.185 0.198 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.083 0.088 0.113 0.141 0.147 0.159 0.172 
F-statistic 16.845 12.235 12.082 12.502 11.004 6.993 7.592 
Prob. 
(F-statistic) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Since in regression (6) and (7) the examined dummy variables are not significant neither 
hot market periods nor VC backing bring structural change into the model. The F-
statistics reject the null hypothesis of insignificance in all of the regression, hence, the 
presented variables can jointly predict level of underpricing in our sample of European 
IPOs. 
The results of the two previous sections present a similar picture of the European IPO 
market. However, in case of our primary explanatory variable we find contradictive 
results which make the results slightly inconsistent. We document that (1) venture 
capitalists do not certify the offer, which give rise to underpricing, but that they leave less 
money on the table as they should sell less shares in IPOs; (2) offer size pushes initial 
returns higher; (3) age of issuing firm and (4) length of lock-up period lowers 
underpricing; (5) number of IPOs in the year of a given IPO increases underpricing; and 
(6) hot market periods affect initial returns negatively. 
 
5.1.2 The US IPO Market 
This section examines the US IPO market and the possible drivers of underpricing. 
Similar to the previous section, Table 10 shows the initial return as dependent variable 
and the same explanatory variables. Similar to the results from the underpricing analysis 
in Table 2, we document that the dummy variable TYPE is positive and statistically 
significant. This finding contrast with the results what Megginson and Weiss (1991) 
report along with the certification hypothesis as well. The size of the offering (LOGSIZE) 
is positive and significant at 5% level in all of the regressions. Firm age shows the same 
coefficient characteristics as they do in the previous tables, namely, age reduces 
underpricing, especially in VC-backed IPOs. Hence, we can state with certainty that firm 
age has significant effect on initial return in both regions. On the one hand, we find that 
the coefficient of the yearly number of IPOs is positive and significant. On the other hand, 
we also document that in hot market periods initial returns are being lowered. Similar to 
the European market, lock-up period has a negative and significant effect on underpricing. 
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Moreover, we find that lock-up periods have stronger effect, more the two times, on VC-
backed listings than they have on non-backed ones.  
We find the interaction regressions insignificant in this case as well based on the dummy 
variables. The explanatory variables are jointly significant in the US as well. 
Table 10: Initial Returns of the US Matched Sample 
Multivariate Tests 
First-day returns are calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer price to the closing price of the stock 
at the end of the first trading day. Following Lee and Wahal (2004), each VC-backed IPO is matched with a non 
VC-backed IPO with the same 2-digit SIC industry code and with the closest offer size. The dummy variable TYPE 
shows whether the IPO is VC-backed (VC-backed = 1, non VC-backed = 0). LOGSIZE explanatory variable is the 
natural log of offer size in USD millions. Firm age is calculated as the time span between foundation and IPO date 
in years. The dummy variable MARKET shows whether a given IPO has taken place in the time intervals either 
2004-2007 or 2013-2015. Lock-up periods are calculated as units where one unit reflects 180 days. Statistical 
significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Standard deviations are presented in brackets. In 
regression (6) and (7) first we show the coefficients of the variables and then we present the coefficients of the 
interaction variables created with the help of dummy variables MARKET and TYPE, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Initial return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept -17.69*** 
[5.368] 
-13.88** 
[5.474] 
-46.97*** 
[5.499] 
-40.11*** 
[5.546] 
-31.21*** 
[6.336] 
-25.83*** 
[7.914] 
-25.73*** 
[9.776] 
TYPE 11.20*** 
[1.711] 
8.48 
[1.891] 
13.47*** 
[1.795] 
12.63*** 
[1.781] 
11.52*** 
[1.819] 
8.38*** 
[2.296] 
-13.29 
[12.600] 
TYPE+MA
RKET 
- - - - - 6.48 
[6.238] 
- 
LOGSIZE 7.80*** 
[1.133] 
8.11*** 
[1.134] 
9.30*** 
[1.06] 
8.82*** 
[1.055] 
8.72*** 
[1.053] 
9.52*** 
[1.326] 
4.64*** 
[1.532] 
LOGSIZE+
MARKET 
- - - - - -2.82 
[2.178] 
- 
LOGSIZE+
TYPE 
- - - - - - 7.87*** 
[2.109] 
AGE - -0.25*** 
[0.073] 
-0.14** 
[0.069] 
-0.13* 
[0.068] 
-0.13* 
[0.068] 
-0.11 
[0.087] 
0.04 
[0.092] 
AGE+MAR
KET 
- - - - - -0.03 
[0.140] 
- 
AGE+TYP
E 
- - - - - - -0.37*** 
[0.137] 
NUMBERI
PO 
- - 0.21*** 
[0.013] 
0.20*** 
[0.012] 
0.19*** 
[0.013] 
0.18*** 
[0.014] 
0.13*** 
[0.021] 
      0.031 
[0.094] 
 
       0.09*** 
[0.027] 
MARKET - - - -10.67*** 
[1.662] 
-10.19*** 
[1.667] 
-23.61 
[17.447] 
-10.83*** 
[2.327] 
MARKET+
TYPE 
- - - - - - 5.03 
[3.398] 
LOCKUP - - - - -7.28*** 
[2.522] 
-15.27*** 
[3.154] 
10.51** 
[5.876] 
LOCKUP+
MARKET 
- - - - - 21.71*** 
[5.375] 
- 
LOCKUP+
TYPE 
- - - - -  -18.72*** 
[6.563] 
R-squared 0.044 0.050 0.169 0.186 0.190 0.199 0.208 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.043 0.048 0.167 0.184 0.187 0.194 0.203 
F-statistic 43.863 33.110 96.627 87.169 74.309 42.733 45.241 
Prob. 
(F-statistic) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 11 presents the same regressions with the amount of ‘money left on the table’ as 
dependent variable. Venture-backing has the same effect on the dependent variable as we 
find in the previous regressions, as the coefficient associated to this variable is positive 
and significant in all but the last regression. In regression (7) the dummy variable TYPE 
is significant this time, which implies that venture capital backing brings structural 
change into our model. We report positive and significant coefficient for the variable 
LOGSIZE. Furthermore, firm age shows similar characteristics what we find in the 
previous regressions and so do the variables NUMBERIPO, MARKET and LOCKUP.  
However, in this case, variables for length of lock-up period, number of IPOs, and hot 
market periods are not significant when analysing the interaction effect of venture capital 
involvement. 
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Table 11: Amount of ‘money left on the table’ of the US Matched Samples 
Multivariate Tests 
Amount of ‘money left on the table’ is calculated as the price difference between offer price and first-day closing price 
of the stock multiplied by the number of shares issued. Following Lee and Wahal (2004), each VC-backed IPO is 
matched with a non VC-backed IPO with the same 2-digit SIC industry code and with the closest offer size. The 
dummy variable TYPE shows whether the IPO is VC-backed (VC-backed = 1, non VC-backed = 0). LOGSIZE 
explanatory variable is the natural log of offer size in USD millions. Firm age is calculated as the time span between 
foundation and IPO date in years. The dummy variable MARKET shows whether a given IPO has taken place in the 
time intervals either 2004-2007 or 2013-2015. Lock-up periods are calculated as units where one unit reflects 180 
days. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Standard deviations are presented 
in brackets.  In regression (6) and (7) first we show the coefficients of the variables and then we present the coefficients 
of the interaction variables created with the help of dummy variables MARKET and TYPE, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Amount of ‘money left on the table’ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept -217.93*** 
[13.186] 
-206.36*** 
[13.425] 
-259.49*** 
[14.027] 
-251.81*** 
[14.269] 
-235.34*** 
[16.319] 
-287.12*** 
[20.227] 
-196.53*** 
[25.273] 
TYPE 21.92*** 
[4.203] 
13.66*** 
[4.638] 
21.68*** 
[4.578] 
20.74*** 
[4.583] 
18.68*** 
[4.685] 
12.40** 
[5.869] 
-73.23** 
[32.573] 
TYPE+M
ARKET 
- - - - - 9.56 
[15.943] 
- 
LOGSIZE 52.83*** 
[2.783] 
53.77*** 
[2.780] 
55.68*** 
[2.712] 
55.14*** 
[2.714] 
54.96*** 
[2.713] 
68.57*** 
[3.390] 
42.14*** 
[3.960] 
LOGSIZE
+MARKE
T 
- - - - - -36.99 
[5.566] 
- 
LOGSIZE
+TYPE 
- - - - - - 25.12 
[5.452] 
AGE - -0.74*** 
[0.180] 
-0.57*** 
[0.176] 
-0.57*** 
[0.176] 
-0.56*** 
[0.176] 
-0.77*** 
[0.222] 
-0.21 
[0.238] 
AGE+MA
RKET 
- - - - - 0.50 
[0.357] 
- 
AGE+TY
PE 
- - - - - - -0.92*** 
[0.354] 
NUMBER
IPO 
- - 0.33*** 
[0.032] 
0.33*** 
[0.032] 
0.30*** 
[0.034] 
0.31*** 
0.035 
0.28*** 
0.055 
NUMBER
IPO+MA
RKET 
- - - - - -0.10 
[0.241] 
- 
NUMBER
IPO+TYP
E 
- - - - - - 0.03 
[0.071] 
MARKET - - - -11.94*** 
[4.277] 
-11.06** 
[4.294] 
134.15*** 
[44.591] 
-16.05*** 
[6.015] 
MARKET
+TYPE 
- - - - - - 12.21 
[8.785] 
LOCKUP - - - - -13.48** 
[6.497] 
-20.48** 
[8.060] 
4.38 
[15.191] 
LOCKUP
+MARKE
T 
- - - - - 23.69* 
[13.737] 
- 
LOCKUP
+TYPE 
- - - - - - -19.01 
[16.967] 
R-squared 0.167 0.174 0.219 0.222 0.224 0.244 0.235 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.166 0.173 0.217 0.220 0.221 0.239 0.231 
F-statistic 191.178 134.218 133.363 108.632 91.401 55.633 53.082 
Prob. 
(F-
statistic) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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5.2 Grandstanding Hypothesis 
In this section, we use regression analysis to study whether VC-backed IPOs show 
different characteristics if they are backed by established or less-experienced venture 
capital firms. Capital under management of venture capitalists is used as proxy for 
reputation. The dependent variables are, as in the previous section, initial return and 
amount of ‘money left on the table’. Regressions are performed on the following 
independent variables: 1) firm age; 2) time to exit; 3) underwriter ranking; 4) offer size; 
5) number of financing rounds; 6) number of VC funds; 7) capital under management; 8) 
number of IPOs in the year of the IPO; 9) hot market periods; 10) length of lock-up period; 
and 11) VC’s capital under management. Additionally, we introduce two variables with 
which we intend to analyse interaction effects. As we mentioned earlier, underpricing is 
a cost that companies bear when they go public because of the uncertainty of the 
company’s true value. The younger the company, the greater is the underpricing. 
Therefore, we expect the coefficients to be at least partly supportive for the grandstanding 
hypothesis.  
 
5.2.1 The European IPO Market 
Table 12 and Table 13 presents the results of regression analyses regarding the European 
VC-backed IPO market. Most important, we find that IPOs that are backed by less 
reputable VCs are significantly more underpriced than ones backed by more established 
venture capitalists. This finding is consistent with the academic wisdom. 
In general, higher-quality underwriters tend to take higher-quality companies public. If 
this is the case, the relation between rank and initial return should be negative and 
significant since firms with high quality can be taken public less underpriced. In contrast, 
we document that underwriter rank positively related to the level of initial return but the 
relation is insignificant. Furthermore, RANK+SMALL is also positively related to 
underpricing, implying that among less established venture capital firms IPO 
underwriters with higher ranks result in higher level of underpricing. Moreover, we did 
not find any evidence that offer size is in relation to underpricing for less experienced 
VCs. 
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In sum, most of the results favour the grandstanding explanation, that is, the relation 
between reputation and capital underpricing is consistent with academic literature. 
 
Table 12: Initial Return of the European VC Backed IPOs 
Multivariate Tests 
 
 
Table 13 presents regressions with the independent variable amount of ‘money left on the 
table’. The regression specifications are identical to those in Tables 10. Most important, 
First-day returns are calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer price to the closing price of the stock 
at the end of the first trading day The dummy variable SMALL shows whether the IPO is backed by less experienced 
VCs (VCs with average capital under management less than €300 million = 1, otherwise = 0). LOGSIZE explanatory 
variable is the natural log of offer size in € million. Firm age is calculated as the time span between foundation and 
IPO date in years. EXITTIME captures the time between the first investment date and the IPO date in years. The 
dummy variable MARKET shows whether a given IPO has taken place in the time intervals either 2004-2007 or 
2013-2015. Lock-up periods are calculated as units where one unit reflects 180 days.  Statistical significance is 
represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  Standard deviations are presented in brackets. 
Dependent variable: Initial Return   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 6.51*** 
[2.103] 
4.69* 
[2.387] 
1.45 
[3.513] 
0.07 
[4.157] 
0.87 
[3.260] 
2.45 
[3.143] 
AGE 0.03 
[0.042] 
0.03 
[(0.042] 
0.00 
[0.041] 
0.00 
[0.041] 
0.02 
[0.041] 
0.01 
[0.041] 
EXITTIME 0.19 
[0.305] 
0.20 
[0.304] 
0.40 
[0.300] 
0.44 
[0.307] 
0.52* 
[0.312] 
0.52* 
[0.309] 
ROUNDS -0.52 
[0.416] 
-0.74 
[0.495] 
-0.77 
[0.473] 
-0.83* 
[0.484] 
-0.88* 
[0.490] 
-0.99** 
[0.489] 
RANK - 4.21 
[2.808] 
1.72 
[3.023] 
1.50 
[3.058] 
3.89 
[2.962] 
- 
FUNDS 
 
- 0.30 
0.4897 
[0.436] 
0.11 
0.7963 
[0.420] 
0.16 
0.7105 
[0.431] 
0.15 
(0.438 
0.26 
[0.431] 
LOGSIZE 
 
- - 2.24*** 
[0.787] 
2.18*** 
[0.798] 
1.96** 
[0.808] 
- 
 
SIZE+SMAL
L 
- - - - - 0.01 
[0.006] 
FUNDSIZE - - -0.01** 
[0.003] 
-0.01** 
[0.003] 
- - 
SMALL - - - - 3.79** 
[1.761] 
- 
LOCKUP - - -3.05*** 
[1.009] 
-2.87*** 
[1.050] 
-2.49** 
[1.050] 
-2.29** 
[1.034] 
NUMBERIP
OS 
- - - 0.63 
[1.854] 
0.02 
[0.017] 
0.02 
[0.017] 
MARKET - - - 0.01 
[0.017] 
0.84 
[1.887] 
0.70 
[1.868] 
RANK+SM
ALL 
- - - - - 10.09*** 
[3.65] 
R-squared 0.015 0.030 0.132 0.134 0.110 0.121 
Adj. R-
squared 
-0.003 0.001 0.089 0.081 0.055 0.072 
F-statistic 0.825 1.033 3.092 2.498 1.993 2.472 
Prob. (F-
statistic) 
0.488 0.399 0.003 0.008 0.037 0.011 
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‘money left on the table’ is positively related to size, but the coefficient associated to less 
experienced VC (SMALL) is not statistically significant. The interaction variables show 
the same characteristics as they do in the previous regressions. Surprisingly, the 
interaction variables increase the estimation power of the model, from nearly 0.25 to 0.57 
and 0.58 in regressions (5) and (6), respectively.  
 
Table 13: Amount of ‘money left on the table’ of the European VC Backed IPOs 
Multivariate Tests 
Amount of ‘money left on the table’ is calculated as the price difference between offer price and first-day closing 
price of the stock multiplied by the number of shares issued. The dummy variable SMALL shows whether the IPO is 
backed by less experienced VCs (VCs with average capital under management less than €300 million = 1, otherwise 
= 0). LOGSIZE explanatory variable is the natural log of offer size in € million. Firm age is calculated as the time 
span between foundation and IPO date in years. EXITTIME captures the time between the first investment date and 
the IPO date in years. The dummy variable MARKET shows whether a given IPO has taken place in the time intervals 
either 2004-2007 or 2013-2015. Lock-up periods are calculated as units where one unit reflects 180 days. Statistical 
significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Standard deviations are presented in brackets. 
Dependent variable: Amount of ‘money left on the table’   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 10.44 
0.1259 
[6.788] 
-1.63 
0.8284 
[7.504] 
-42.76 
0.0001 
[10.564] 
-41.54 
0.0011 
[12.468] 
-8.40 
0.2527 
[7.315] 
-6.71 
0.3389 
[6.991] 
AGE 0.18 
[0.135] 
0.18 
[0.131] 
0.03 
[0.123] 
0.04 
[0.124] 
0.03 
[0.093] 
0.03 
[0.091] 
EXITTIME -0.14 
[0.983] 
-0.08 
[0.956] 
-0.08 
[0.902] 
-0.13 
[0.920] 
0.51 
[0.700] 
0.50 
[0.687] 
ROUNDS -0.43 
[1.344] 
-1.94 
[1.55] 
-2.03 
[1.421] 
-1.95 
[1.450] 
-1.70 
[1.101] 
-2.00* 
[1.088] 
RANK - 27.45*** 
[8.827] 
3.11 
[9.092] 
4. 
[9.171] 
1.4 
[6.645] 
- 
FUNDS 
 
- 2.11 
[1.371] 
1.99 
[1.262] 
1.99 
[1.292] 
0.84 
[0.983] 
1.06 
[0.958] 
LOGSIZE 
 
- - 14.05*** 
[2.366] 
14.06*** 
[2.394] 
13.83*** 
[2.414] 
- 
SIZE+SMAL
L 
- - - - - 0.08*** 
[0.019] 
FUNDSIZE - - 0.00 
[0.009] 
0.00 
[0.010] 
- - 
SMALL - - - - 6.44 
[3.950] 
- 
LOCKUP - - -1.42 
[3.034] 
-2.01 
[3.148] 
-3.29 
[2.357] 
-3.13 
[0.176] 
MARKET - - - -6.43 
[5.560] 
-1.97 
[4.234] 
-2.87 
[4.154] 
NUMBERIP
O 
- - - 0.02 
[0.052] 
0.06* 
[0.039] 
0.06 
[0.038] 
RANK+SM
ALL 
- - - - - 22.33*** 
[8.679] 
R-squared 0.013 0.078 0.245 0.251 0.569 0.585 
Adj. R-
squared 
-0.005 0.050 0.208 0.205 0.543 0.559 
F-statistic 0.713 2.814 6.605 5.396 21.262 22.658 
Prob. (F-
statistic) 
0.545 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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5.2.2 The US IPO Market 
Table 14 presents the grandstanding regressions we conducted on the US market. Most 
important, the coefficient associated to less experienced VC (SMALL) is large in size and 
significance. Hence, we can state that less established VCs underprice IPOs more than 
seasoned ones. In contrast to Gompers (1996), we document that offer size does not 
reduce underpricing. However, for small VCs the size of this effect drops substantially. 
The discrepancy between Gomper’s result and ours could be due to the lack of signalling 
power what underwrites might bring into IPO deals. The coefficient of the interaction 
variable RANK+SMALL is positive and significant according to our results, which 
implies that higher-quality underwriters do not seem to be able reduce uncertainty around 
VC-backed IPOs. The effect of maturity, which is represented by AGE, and EXITTIME, 
is negative and significant, which is similar to other papers’ findings (Gompers, 1996; 
Lee and Wahal, 2004). 
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Table 14: Initial Return of the US VC Backed IPOs 
Multivariate Tests 
First-day returns are calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer price to the closing price of the stock 
at the end of the first trading day. The dummy variable SMALL shows whether the IPO is backed by less experienced 
VCs (VCs with average capital under management less than $400 million = 1, otherwise = 0). LOGSIZE explanatory 
variable is the natural log of offer size in $ millions. Firm age is calculated as the time span between foundation and 
IPO date in years. EXITTIME captures the time between the first investment date and the IPO date in years. The 
dummy variable MARKET shows whether a given IPO has taken place in the time intervals either 2004-2007 or 2013-
2015. Lock-up periods are calculated as units where one unit reflects 180 days. Statistical significance is represented 
by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Standard deviations are presented in brackets. 
Dependent variable: Initial Return   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 33.17*** 
[3.869] 
-18.04* 
[9.526] 
71.28*** 
[6.872] 
-22.50* 
[11.962] 
-51.88 
[10.310] 
-1.82 
[6.449] 
AGE -0.32** 
[0.140] 
-0.44*** 
[0.139] 
-0.25* 
[0.131] 
-0.23* 
[0.126] 
-0.24* 
[0.123] 
-0.09 
[0.126] 
EXITTIME -1.09*** 
[0.418] 
-1.14*** 
[0.410] 
-0.67* 
[0.382] 
-0.20 
[0.376] 
-0.19 
[0.367] 
-0.13 
[0.379] 
ROUNDS 1.19* 
[0.645] 
1.42** 
[0.630] 
- 0.96 
[0.591] 
0.86 
[0.576] 
0.71 
[0.595] 
RANK - 1.46*** 
[0.449] 
1.47*** 
[0.394] 
1.04** 
[0.410] 
1.01** 
[0.399] 
- 
FUNDS 
 
- - 1.04*** 
[0.359] 
- 0.81** 
[0.347] 
0.86** 
[0.357] 
LOGSIZE 
 
- 9.44*** 
[2.111] 
- 9.23*** 
[1.909] 
9.17*** 
[1.858] 
- 
SIZE+SMAL
L 
- - - - - 0.03 
[0.019] 
FUNDSIZE - - -0.05*** 
[0.008] 
-0.04*** 
[0.008] 
- - 
SMALL - - - - 36.45*** 
[3.973] 
- 
LOCKUP - - -24.50*** 
[3.287] 
-7.75** 
[3.470] 
-7.06** 
[3.383] 
-7.75** 
[3.470] 
MARKET - - - -13.60*** 
[2.924] 
-12.24*** 
[2.858] 
-13.60*** 
[2.924] 
NUMBERIP
O 
- - - 0.25*** 
[0.025] 
0.25*** 
[0.024]] 
0.24*** 
[0.025] 
RANK+SM
ALL 
- - - - - 3.52*** 
[0.552] 
R-squared 0.020 0.061 0.153 0.258 0.293 0.244 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.017 0.056 0.147 0.250 0.286 0.237 
F-statistic 6.505 12.408 28.452 32.786 39.210 33.934 
Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Table 15 shows the same regressions what we conducted in the previous table but now 
we plug our second dependent variable into the equation. Regression specifications 
indicate that the relations are really similar to the ones from the other setup. Most 
important, we find negative relation between underwriter rank and amount of ‘money left 
on the table’, however, the relation is insignificant. However, for small VCs the 
coefficient is significant which supports the grandstanding hypothesis.  
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Table 15: Amount of ‘money left on the table’ of the US VC Backed IPOs 
Multivariate Tests 
Amount of ‘money left on the table’ is calculated as the price difference between offer price and first-day closing 
price of the stock multiplied by the number of shares issued. The dummy variable SMALL shows whether the IPO is 
backed by less experienced VCs (VCs with average capital under management less than USD 400m = 1, otherwise = 
0). LOGSIZE explanatory variable is the natural log of offer size in $ millions. Firm age is calculated as the time span 
between foundation and IPO date in years. EXITTIME captures the time between the first investment date and the 
IPO date in years. The dummy variable MARKET shows whether a given IPO has taken place in the time intervals 
either 2004-2007 or 2013-2015. Lock-up periods are calculated as units where one unit reflects 180 days. Statistical 
significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Standard deviations are presented in brackets. 
Dependent variable: Amount of ‘money left on the table’   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 45.70*** 
[9.560] 
-259.91 
[21.541] 
97.94*** 
[17.460] 
-269.84*** 
[28.950] 
-309.07*** 
[25.352] 
10.40 
[15.823] 
AGE -0.47 
[0.347] 
-1.28*** 
[0.314] 
-0.42 
[0.332] 
-0.94*** 
[0.305] 
-0.96*** 
[0.302] 
-0.13 
[0.308] 
EXITTIME -1.05 
[1.032] 
-1.55* 
[0.921] 
-0.23 
[0.971] 
-0.22 
[0.910] 
-0.22 
[0.902] 
-0.43 
[0.930] 
ROUNDS 2.30 
[1.593] 
4.04*** 
[1.425] 
- 3.13** 
[1.430] 
2.99** 
[1.418] 
1.37 
[1.459] 
RANK - 0.16 
[1.015] 
4.99*** 
[1.002] 
-0.54 
[0.992] 
-0.59 
[0.982] 
- 
FUNDS 
 
- - 1.47 
[0.913] 
- 1.75** 
[0.853] 
1.80** 
[0.877] 
LOGSIZE 
 
- 67.24*** 
[4.774] 
- 67.29*** 
[4.619] 
67.14*** 
[4.569] 
- 
SIZE+SMAL
L 
- - - - - 0.62*** 
[0.046] 
FUNDSIZE - - -0.09*** 
[0.020] 
-0.06*** 
[0.018] 
- - 
SMALL - - - - 51.19*** 
[9.769] 
- 
LOCKUP - - -40.17*** 
[8.352] 
-15.59* 
[8.397] 
-14.65* 
[8.320] 
-25.16*** 
[8.498] 
MARKET - - - -14.93** 
[7.076] 
-13.00* 
[7.028] 
-18.57** 
[7.241] 
NUMBERIP
O 
- - - 0.36*** 
[0.060] 
0.352*** 
[0.060] 
0.28*** 
[0.061] 
RANK+SM
ALL 
- - - - - -2.59* 
[1.355] 
R-squared 0.007 0.212 0.092 0.278 0.092 0.244 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.003 0.208 0.086 0.270 0.086 0.237 
F-statistic 2.0811 51.094 15.916 36.363 15.916 33.965 
Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.101 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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6 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we examine the short-term impact of venture capital backing in initial public 
offerings between 2000 and 2015. Our sample of VC-backed deals from 2000-2015 were 
matched to a control sample of non VC-backed listings by industry and offering size. We 
provided support against the certification role of venture capitalists, that is, venture 
backing does not certify the true value of the IPO firm. Explanations can be that the 
majority of IPO investors may see venture capital industry as a shadow-like, blurry asset 
class, or that venture capital investments are generally associated with high level of risk. 
Our results are consistent with the idea that venture capital firms with less reputation 
undertake actions, such as taking companies public that needs higher underpricing to have 
a successful IPO, in order to signal their quality, thus, successfully raising capital for 
subsequent funds. 
Our study has made a significant contribution to existing literature because it examines 
both the European and the US IPO markets. Moreover, in spite of the large number of 
academic studies related to underpricing and venture capital, the literature seems to have 
a gap in research over recent years, which is being filled by our study. 
The findings of our study has several implications for investors and other IPO market 
participants as well. First, retail and institutional investors might gain a deeper insight 
into the characteristics of the IPO market and the behaviour of issuers, more specifically 
on venture-backed listings. Second, management of issuing firms might obtain a better 
understanding of the financial aspects of an IPO as an exit route and a better 
understanding of the decision drivers of VCs.   
Finally, future research should examine the private equity-backed IPOs in detail and make 
comparisons to venture capital-backed IPOs in order to detect any differences or 
similarities regarding post-IPO short-term stock performance. Furthermore, it could also 
be interesting to extend the sample by including other regions where the venture capital 
industry plays a significant role, such as Asia and Australia.  
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8 Appendix 
 
 
Figure 10: Graph of Number of IPOs and Average Initial Return in the US, 2000-2015  
 
 
Figure 11: Graph of Average Amount of ‘Money Left on the Table’ and Average Initial 
Return in the US, 2000-2015 
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Figure 12: Graph of Number of IPOs and Average Initial Return in Europe, 2000-2015   
 
 
Figure 13: Graph of Average Amount of ‘Money Left on the Table’ and Average Initial 
Return in Europe, 2000-2015 
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